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Abstract
Traditional real options analysis addresses investment under uncer-
tainty assuming a risk-neutral decision maker and complete markets.
In reality, however, decision makers are often risk averse and mar-
kets are incomplete. Additionally, capital projects are seldom now-
or-never investments and can be abandoned, suspended, and resumed
at any time.
In this thesis, we develop a utility-based framework in order to ex-
amine the impact of operational ﬂexibility, via suspension and re-
sumption options, on optimal investment policies and option values.
Assuming a risk-averse decision maker with perpetual options to sus-
pend and resume a project costlessly, we conﬁrm that risk aversion
lowers the probability of investment and demonstrate how this eﬀect
can be mitigated by incorporating operational ﬂexibility. Also, we il-
lustrate how increased risk aversion may facilitate the abandonment of
a project while delaying its temporary suspension prior to permanent
resumption.
Besides timing, a ﬁrm may have the freedom to scale the investment’s
installed capacity. We extend the traditional real options approach to
investment under uncertainty with discretion over capacity by allow-
ing for a constant relative risk aversion utility function and operational
ﬂexibility in the form of suspension and resumption options. We ﬁnd
that, with the option to delay investment, increased risk aversion fa-
cilitates investment and decreases the required investment threshold
price by reducing the amount of installed capacity.
We explore strategic aspects of decision making under uncertainty
by examining how duopolistic competition aﬀects the entry decisions
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of risk-averse investors. Depending on the discrepancy between the
market share of the leader and the follower, greater uncertainty may
increase or decrease the discrepancy in the non-pre-emptive leader’s
relative value. Furthermore, risk aversion does not aﬀect the loss in
the value of the leader for the pre-emptive duopoly setting, but it
makes the loss in value relatively less for the leader in a non-pre-
emptive duopoly setting.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Managing the investment and operational risk of capital projects is crucial to the
economic viability of many industries. Given the deregulation of many sectors
of the economy, including infrastructure, and the recent volatility in ﬁnancial
markets, decision rules for managing capital projects should consider discretion
over timing and uncertainty in underlying variables. Indeed, accounting for these
features often yields signiﬁcantly diﬀerent expected project values and optimal
investment and operational policies than those from the traditional net present
value (NPV) approach, which has been a mainstay for industry and policymakers
alike.
Further complicating the use of the expected NPV approach is that capital
projects are more complex than simple now-or-never investments since they en-
tail embedded options to make additional decisions at arbitrary points in time
in response to the values of realised state variables. Such managerial discretion
implies the right, but not the obligation, to undertake decisions in the future;
thus, capital projects may be considered as packages of compound ﬁnancial op-
tions. Ever since simple ﬁnancial call options were valued analytically (Black and
Scholes, 1973 and Merton, 1973), they have been amenable to supporting deci-
sion making in non-ﬁnancial settings. Consequently, the ﬁeld of real options has
sought to exploit this application potential in decision making under uncertainty
by analysing capital projects as a series of options. The theory of real options
indicates that uncertainty and irreversibility create a value of waiting with under-
taking capital investments. This happens because the information that becomes
15
available over time allows for uncertainty to be resolved, thereby enabling the
decision maker to take better investment decisions at a later time.
Examples of analytical real options theory include McDonald and Siegel (1985,
1986) who explore the optimal timing of investment in an irreversible project with
revenues that follow a continuous-time stochastic process. Brennan and Schwartz
(1985) show how to value assets whose cash ﬂows depend on highly variable out-
put prices and exploit the property of replicating self-ﬁnancing portfolios in order
to derive optimal policies from managing these assets. Majd and Pindyck (1987)
use the contingent claims approach to analyse the ﬂexibility that lies within the
time it takes to build an investment project. Bar-Ilan and Strange (1996) present
an analytical solution to the investment problem with lags and show that conven-
tional results regarding the eﬀect of price uncertainty on investment are weakened
or reversed when there are lags. Deng et al. (2001) present a methodology for
valuing electricity derivatives by constructing replicating portfolios from electric-
ity futures and the risk-free asset. Gollier et al. (2005) examine how a producer
faced with a change in the competitive price of electricity will be able to com-
pare a sequence of investments in medium-capacity nuclear power plants with
an investment in a high-capacity unit. In other words, they examine how to
choose between the ﬂexibility of the modular investment and the eﬃciency of the
high-capacity unit due to increase in economy of scale. Lund (2005) analyses
the relationship between investment and uncertainty in real options models and,
in addition to the positive eﬀect of uncertainty on the trigger level for revenue
relative to cost, identiﬁes an opposing eﬀect on the probability of investment that
yields a total eﬀect with ambiguous sign. Malchow-Møller and Thorsen (2005) ex-
tend the traditional investment under uncertainty setup with a single investment
option to the case of inﬁnite repeated options.
One gap in the real options framework is that it assumes that ﬁnancial markets
are complete, and, therefore, that the investor is risk neutral. This is at odds
with how operational research has traditionally tackled decision making under
uncertainty, viz., under the premise of a risk-averse agent whose preferences for
wealth are summarised by a utility function. Especially for projects that involve
undiversiﬁable risks, such as research and development (R&D) of new products,
risk aversion on part of investors should be considered. A recent working paper
16
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uses a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility function to illustrate that
investment under uncertainty with risk aversion results not only in a further
delay in investment but also reduces the probability of investment (Hugonnier
and Morellec, 2007). This working paper applies the analytical framework of
Karatzas and Shreve (1999), in which the strong Markov property of the geometric
Brownian motion (GBM) describing the project’s value is exploited to cast the
investment timing problem as an optimal stopping one. In order to facilitate the
analysis, the expected project value is expressed as the product of the stochastic
discount factor and the expected present value of the cash ﬂows from an active
project. Subsequently, the value of the investment opportunity may be maximised
by selecting the ﬁrst passage time of the project value to a certain threshold.
However, it remains an open question how strong this interaction between risk
aversion and uncertainty would be if the project included embedded options,
such as operational ﬂexibility, the right to scale the capacity size, or the impact
of competition. Through this thesis, we aim to bridge the gaps in real options
theory so that it may be more suitable not only for decision making but also for
risk assessment.
1.1 Optimal Investment under Operational Flex-
ibility, Risk Aversion, and Uncertainty
Dixit and Pindyck (1994) and McDonald and Siegel (1985, 1986) address the prob-
lem of optimal entry to and exit from a project assuming a risk-neutral decision
maker with a perpetual option to invest. This canonical real options problem can
be solved via either the contingent claims approach, assuming that either mar-
kets are complete or the project’s unique risk can be diversiﬁed, or via dynamic
programming, using a subjective discount rate. Contingent claims analysis, how-
ever, cannot be used in cases where the project’s risk is not diversiﬁable. This
occurs, for example, in R&D projects with technical risk that is idiosyncratic, or
in nascent markets that may not have suﬃciently developed ﬁnancial instruments.
Furthermore, the decision maker may be inherently risk averse due to the ﬁrm’s
ownership structure, e.g., in the case of a municipal authority or due to costs
17
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of ﬁnancial distress. Dynamic programming can then be used to maximise the
expected discounted utility of the lifetime proﬁts of a risk-averse decision maker.
In the real options literature, diﬀerent types of operational ﬂexibility have
been studied mainly under the assumption of a risk-neutral decision maker. For
example, Majd and Pindyck (1987) analyse the ﬂexibility that lies within the time
it takes to build an investment project. Their analysis is based on the fact that
the rate at which the construction of an investment project proceeds is ﬂexible
and can, therefore, be adjusted as new information becomes available. Apply-
ing contingent claims analysis, they show how traditional discounted cash ﬂow
methods understate the value of the project by ignoring this ﬂexibility. How-
ever, their analysis is restricted by the assumptions of market completeness and
a risk-neutral decision maker. Malchow-Møller and Thorsen (2005) consider the
case of repeated investment options, thereby extending the single-option model
that was ﬁrst developed by McDonald and Siegel (1986) in which the option is
killed when investment is undertaken. Their analysis shows that when invest-
ment options are repeated, the value of waiting is reduced signiﬁcantly compared
to the single-option case and that the simple NPV rule is a better indicator of
optimal investment. Also, sensitivity analysis reveals that the eﬀects of param-
eter changes are very diﬀerent under the repeated-options approach than in the
single-option model. Nevertheless, each of these papers assumes a risk-neutral
decision maker.
Since the assumptions of risk neutrality and market completeness are not par-
ticularly relevant to most real-life situations, it is important to examine the impli-
cations that arise when these assumptions are relaxed. A utility-based framework
has been adopted, for example, by Henderson and Hobson (2002), who extend
the real options approach to pricing and hedging assets by taking the perspec-
tive of a risk-averse decision maker facing incomplete markets. Their analysis
is based on Merton (1969) who studies a decision maker facing complete mar-
kets seeking to maximise the expected utility of terminal wealth over a ﬁxed and
continuous time horizon using a CRRA utility function. Henderson and Hobson
(2002) extend Merton’s analysis by introducing a second risky asset on which no
trading is allowed. In that case, the decision maker has a claim on units of the
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non-traded asset, and the question is how to price and hedge this random pay-
oﬀ. Furthermore, Henderson (2007) investigates the impact of risk aversion and
incompleteness on investment timing and option value by a risk-averse decision
maker with an exponential utility function who can choose at any time to under-
take an irreversible investment project and receive a risky payoﬀ. To oﬀset some
of the risk associated with the unknown investment payoﬀ, the decision maker also
trades in a risk-free bond and a risky asset that is correlated with the investment
payoﬀ. Results indicate that the higher the decision maker’s risk aversion or the
lower the correlation between the project value and hedging asset, the lower will
the investment threshold and option value be. In particular, there is a parameter
region within which the assumptions of complete and incomplete markets yield
diﬀerent results. In this region, and under the assumption of complete markets,
the option is never exercised (and investment never occurs), whereas the decision
maker exercises the option in the incomplete setting.
More pertinent to our analysis is the working paper by Hugonnier and Morel-
lec (2007), who extend the work of Dixit and Pindyck (1994) and McDonald
and Siegel (1986) by illustrating how risk aversion aﬀects investment under un-
certainty when the decision maker faces incomplete markets. Instead of using
contingent claims, they use an optimal stopping time approach to allow for the
decision maker’s risk aversion to be incorporated via a CRRA utility function.
Their framework is based on a closed-form expression for the expected discounted
utility of stochastic cash ﬂows derived by Karatzas and Shreve (1999). The re-
sults indicate that risk aversion lowers the likelihood of investment and erodes
the value of investment projects. In Chapter 2, we extend Hugonnier and Morel-
lec (2007) by incorporating operational ﬂexibility in the form of suspension and
resumption options that can be exercised at any time at no cost. We will show
how this ﬂexibility can mitigate the eﬀect of risk aversion and oﬀer insights on
how to exercise optimally such suspension and resumption options.
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Aversion and Operational Flexibility
Although investment in a project with discretion over capacity is a real options
problem, the majority of real options models, including the ones that account for
competition, either consider only the problem of optimal investment timing (Dixit
and Pindyck, 1994 and McDonald and Siegel, 1985, 1986) or address the problem
under risk neutrality. In the area of capacity sizing, Dangl (1999) addresses the
problem of a risk-neutral ﬁrm that invests in a project with continuously scalable
capacity using the dynamic programming approach. He ﬁnds that uncertainty
in future demand leads to an increase in optimal installed capacity and causes
investment to be delayed to an extent that even low uncertainty makes waiting
and accumulation of further information the optimal decision for large ranges of
demand. Following the same approach, Huisman and Kort (2009) examine the
same problem in monopoly and duopoly settings and compare their results with
the standard model where the ﬁrm has no discretion over capacity. They con-
ﬁrm that, compared to the model without capacity choice, increased uncertainty
delays investment and leads to higher installed capacity both for the monopolist
and the follower, thereby illustrating how the leader invests later in lower ca-
pacity for low uncertainty and earlier at higher capacity for higher uncertainty.
They also ﬁnd that when uncertainty is low, the leader invests in lower capacity
than the follower in order to deter temporarily the follower’s entry and in higher
capacity when uncertainty increases. The ﬂexibility to choose between two al-
ternative investment projects of diﬀerent scales under output price uncertainty
has been studied by De´camps, Mariotti, and Villeneuve (2006). Their analysis
extends the results of Dixit (1993) where the irreversible choice among mutually
exclusive projects under output price uncertainty is considered. Hagspiel et al.
(2010) also account for the production decision, apart from the optimal invest-
ment timing and sizing decisions, by comparing the ﬂexible scenario, where a ﬁrm
can costlessly adjust production over time with the capacity level as the upper
bound, to the inﬂexible scenario, where a ﬁrm ﬁxes production at capacity level
from the moment of investment onward. Among other results, they ﬁnd that
the ﬂexible ﬁrm invests in higher capacity than the inﬂexible ﬁrm and that the
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capacity diﬀerence increases with uncertainty. Although the ﬂexible ﬁrm has an
incentive to invest earlier (because ﬂexibility raises the project value), it also has
an incentive to invest later (because costs are higher due to the larger capacity
level). The latter eﬀect dominates in highly uncertain economic environments.
We contribute to this line of work by analysing the impact of risk aversion on
the optimal investment and sizing decisions of a ﬁrm. Using an optimal stopping
time approach, we allow for risk aversion to be incorporated via a CRRA utility
function. We assume that the risk-averse ﬁrm is a price taker, that it can suspend
and resume operations costlessly depending on the ﬂuctuations of the output
price, and that its option to adjust the capacity of the project expires upon
investment. This framework is based on a closed-form expression for the expected
discounted utility of stochastic cash ﬂows derived by Karatzas and Shreve (1999).
We begin by analysing the case of now-or-never investment and ﬁnd that
increased risk aversion reduces the expected utility of the investment’s payoﬀ,
thereby creating an incentive to reduce the amount of installed capacity. Further-
more, we ﬁnd that, without operational ﬂexibility, increased uncertainty leaves
the optimal capacity of the project unaﬀected under risk neutrality and decreases
it under risk aversion, while the presence of embedded options to suspend and re-
sume operations increases the value of the now-or-never investment opportunity,
thereby motivating the installation of greater capacity.
Next, we account for the option to invest and ﬁnd that in contrast to Hugonnier
and Morellec (2007) who, using the same framework, show that increased risk
aversion erodes option value and increases the required investment threshold, in-
creased risk aversion facilitates investment by reducing the amount of installed
capacity. We show that with higher risk aversion, the incentive to avoid exposure
to unfavourable market conditions by decreasing the amount of installed capacity
is more profound than the incentive to delay investment due to the decrease of
the project’s expected utility.
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1.3 Duopolistic Competition under Risk Aver-
sion and Uncertainty
The majority of real options models account for the problem of optimal invest-
ment timing without considering competition (McDonald and Siegel 1985, 1986),
while the ones that do, assume risk neutrality (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). In
the area of competition, Smets (1993) ﬁrst combined real options valuation tech-
niques with game theory concepts, thus developing a continuous-time model of
strategic real option exercise under product market competition, assuming that
entry is irreversible, demand is stochastic and simultaneous investment occurs
only when the role of the leader is deﬁned exogenously. Williams (1993) provides
the ﬁrst rigorous derivation of a Nash-equilibrium in a real options framework.
Following Smets (1993), Grenadier (1996) develops an equilibrium framework
for option exercise strategies and particularly focuses on the behaviour of real-
estate markets in order to emphasise on the applicability of the model. Through
this framework, he proposes a potential explanation for certain market phenom-
ena such as why some real estate markets have been prone to pronounced bursts
of development activity, while others have been characterised by smooth patterns
of development over time.
Weeds (2002) considers irreversible investment in competing research projects
with uncertain returns under a winner-takes-all patent system. The technological
success of the project is probabilistic, while the economic value of the patent
to be won evolves stochastically over time. Her results indicate that in a pre-
emptive leader-follower equilibrium ﬁrms invest sequentially and option values
are reduced by competition. However, a symmetric outcome may also occur in
which investment is more delayed than the single-ﬁrm counterpart. Comparing
this with the optimal cooperative investment pattern, investment is found to be
more delayed when ﬁrms act non-cooperatively as each holds back from investing
in the fear of starting a patent race.
Grenadier (2002) provides a general and tractable solution approach for deriv-
ing the equilibrium investment strategies of ﬁrms in a Cournot-Nash framework
with more than two competitors. Each ﬁrm faces a sequence of investment oppor-
tunities and must determine an exercise strategy for its path of investment. The
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resulting equilibrium has potentially wide applications. For example, a real es-
tate developer contemplating the construction of an oﬃce building will choose his
optimal time at which to begin construction, contingent upon his beliefs about
the decisions of other developers in the market. The model permits a rather
simple solution approach to the derivation of equilibrium exercise strategies in a
continuous-time stochastic setting.
Thijssen et al. (2002) consider the problem of investment timing under un-
certainty in a duopoly framework and propose a method in order to deal with the
problem of coordination, that arises when both ﬁrms want to enter the market
ﬁrst, involving the use of symmetric mixed strategies. They study ﬁrst-mover ad-
vantage and war of attrition (second-mover advantage) games, thereby extending
the strategy spaces and equilibrium concepts introduced in Fudenberg and Tirole
(1985).
Shackleton et al. (2004) analyse the entry decisions of competing ﬁrms in a
two-player stochastic real option game, when rivals earn diﬀerent but correlated
uncertain proﬁtabilities from operating. They determine an explicit measure for
the expected time of each ﬁrm being active in the market and the probability of
both rivals entering within a ﬁnite time. In the presence of entry costs, decision
thresholds exhibit hysteresis, the range of which is decreasing in the correlation
between competing ﬁrms. A measure of the expected time of each ﬁrm being
active in the market and the probability of both rivals entering within a ﬁnite
time are explicitly calculated. The former (latter) is found to decrease (increase)
with the volatility of relative ﬁrm proﬁtabilities implying that market leadership
is shorter-lived the more uncertain the industry environment.
Smit and Trigeorgis (2006) illustrate the use of real options valuation and
game theory principles to analyse prototypical investment opportunities involv-
ing important competitive and strategic decisions under uncertainty. They use
examples from innovation cases, alliances and acquisitions to discuss strategic
and competitive aspects, relevant in a range of industries like consumer electron-
ics and telecoms. Particularly, they focus on whether it is optimal to compete
independently or coordinate via strategic alliances.
Grzegorz and Kort (2006) analyse the situation where two ﬁrms have an op-
portunity to invest in a proﬁt-enhancing investment project and face diﬀerent (ef-
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fective) investment costs. They relax the assumption that the duopolistic rivals
are identical, is motivated by the existence of many sources of potential cost asym-
metry. Investment cost asymmetries may be due to either liquidity constraints,
that increase the investment cost for a ﬁrm that faces capital market imperfec-
tions, or due to diﬀerent degree of organisational ﬂexibility at implementing a
new production technology. Their results indicate that within a certain range of
asymmetry level, a marginal increase in the investment cost of the ﬁrm with the
cost disadvantage can enhance its own value and reduce its rival’s value.
Huisman and Kort (1999) examine how the deterministic duopoly framework
of Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) is aﬀected when uncertainty is introduced. Ac-
cording to Fudenberg and Tirole (1985), under large ﬁrst-mover advantages, a
pre-emption equilibrium occurs with dispersed adoption timings since it is es-
sential for each ﬁrm to move quickly and pre-empt investment by its rivals. The
introduction of uncertainty creates an opposing force since now there is a positive
option value of waiting that becomes larger with higher uncertainty, thereby de-
laying investment. In the simultaneous investment and pre-emptive equilibrium
cases, the results of Huisman and Kort (1999) agree with those of Fudenberg
and Tirole (1985); however, in the stochastic case, uncertainty raises the required
entry threshold for both ﬁrms as it increases the value of waiting. Finally, if
ﬁrst-mover advantages are lower but suﬃciently large for the pre-emptive equi-
librium to result in the deterministic model, then Huisman and Kort (1999) show
that suﬃciently high uncertainty results in simultaneous investment equilibrium,
thereby reducing the number of scenarios where the pre-emptive equilibrium is
optimal.
Paxson and Pinto (2005) extend the traditional real options approach that
treats the number of units sold and the price per unit as an aggregate variable
by presenting a rivalry model in which the proﬁts per unit and the number of
units sold are both stochastic variables. They examine a pre-emptive setting
(where both ﬁrms ﬁght for the leader’s position) and a non-pre-emptive setting
(where the role of the leader is deﬁned exogenously). Their results indicate that
the triggers of both the leader and the follower increase in both settings as the
correlation between the proﬁts per unit and the quantity of units increases since
then the aggregate volatility involving the number of units and the proﬁts per
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unit also increases. Furthermore, they illustrate how the value of the active leader
increases by more than the value of her investment opportunity when the number
of units sold while being alone in the market increases. This, in turn, increases
the non-pre-emptive leader’s incentive to invest, thereby reducing the discrepancy
between the pre-emptive leader’s and non-pre-emptive leader’s entry thresholds.
Finally, they illustrate how increasing ﬁrst-mover advantages create an incentive
for the pre-emptive leader to enter the market sooner since then the entry of the
follower is less damaging.
Unlike earlier studies concerning investment strategies in the electricity mar-
ket, Takashima et al. (2008) show the eﬀect of competition on market entry and
the strategies of ﬁrms with diﬀerent types of power plants. They analyse the
entry strategies into the electricity market of two ﬁrms that have power plants
under price uncertainty and competition and consider ﬁrms with either a thermal
power plant or a nuclear power plant. Among other results, they show that for
a nuclear power plant the entry threshold of the leader is higher compared to a
liquiﬁed natural gas thermal power plant, since the latter has mothballing options
that facilitate investment. Also, compared to the ﬁrm with a coal power plant
or an oil thermal power plant, a ﬁrm with a nuclear power plant tends to be the
leader because variable and construction costs for a nuclear power plant are lower
compared to those of a coal power plant, while the oil thermal power plant may
have lower construction cost but has variable cost that is twice as much as that
of the nuclear power plant.
Huisman and Kort (2009) model not only the timing but also the size of the
investment. They consider a monopoly setting as well as a duopoly setting and
compare the results with the standard models in which the ﬁrms do not have
capacity choice. They identify the region of demand where the leader can choose
either to deter temporarily or to accommodate the entry of the follower and ﬁnd
that the leader can choose the deterrence strategy only up to a certain high level of
demand. If the demand is higher than that level, then it is optimal for the follower
to enter at the same time as the leader. Similarly, if the demand is low, then it is
not optimal for the leader to choose the deterrence strategy as this would result
in negative proﬁts. Also, at high levels of demand, the leader’s optimal strategy is
either to deter or to accommodate the entry of the follower. However, the region
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in which the leader can choose either one of the two strategies decreases with
uncertainty, thereby increasing the range of demand where the leader chooses the
deterrence strategy.
Extending the traditional approach that considers only two competing ﬁrms,
Bouis et al. (2009) analyse investments in new markets where more than two
identical competitors are present. In the setting including three ﬁrms, they ﬁnd
that if entry of the third ﬁrm is delayed, then the second ﬁrm has an incentive
to invest earlier because this ﬁrm can enjoy the duopoly market structure for
a longer time. This reduces the investment incentive for the ﬁrst ﬁrm, which
now faces a shorter period in which it can enjoy monopoly proﬁts, and, thus, it
invests later. This eﬀect is denoted as the accordion eﬀect and is also observed
when the number of competing ﬁrms is greater. Indeed, with more than three
ﬁrms competing, exogenous demand changes aﬀect the timing of entry of the
ﬁrst, third, ﬁfth, etc., investor in the same qualitative way, while the entry of the
second, fourth, sixth, etc., investor is aﬀected in exactly the opposite qualitative
way. In other words, if a delay is observed for the “odd” investors, then the
“even” investors will invest sooner.
Each of these papers assumes a risk-neutral decision maker, and, as a result,
the implications of risk aversion are not addressed. We contribute to this line
of work by developing a utility-based framework in order to examine how opti-
mal investment decisions under uncertainty are aﬀected by competition and risk
aversion. This is relevant to a knowledge-based sector in which ﬁrms compete
to launch a new product while simultaneously facing costs of ﬁnancial distress
or shareholder pressure. In order to describe the preferences of the two ﬁrms,
we apply a CRRA utility function and determine the optimal strategies that
maximise the expected utility of their future proﬁts in both pre-emptive and
non-pre-emptive settings.
We conﬁrm the results of Hugonnier and Morellec (2007) by showing that risk
aversion lowers the expected utility of the project, thereby delaying the entry of
the leader and the follower in both pre-emtpive and non-pre-emptive settings.
We also ﬁnd that, relative to the monopolist, the non-pre-emptive leader is hurt
less from the follower’s entry than the pre-emptive leader since the former has
the ﬂexibility to delay entry into the market. Interestingly, risk aversion does not
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impact the relative loss in the pre-emptive leader’s value due to the follower’s
entry, but makes the non-pre-emptive leader relatively better oﬀ. Furthermore,
we show that higher uncertainty reduces the loss in value of the pre-emptive leader
relative to the monopolist by delaying the entry of the follower, thereby allowing
the pre-emptive leader to enjoy monopoly proﬁts for longer time. In the non-
pre-emptive duopoly setting, we show that if the discrepancy between the market
share of the leader and the follower is small, then the impact of uncertainty on
the leader’s option value is more profound and oﬀsets the loss in value due to
the follower’s entry. By contrast, a large discrepancy in market share makes the
increase in option value less profound as it increases the ﬁrst-mover advantage
and, at the same time, increases the impact of the follower’s entry, thereby making
the non-pre-emptive leader worse oﬀ.
1.4 Structure of the Thesis
The remainder of the thesis is structured as follows. In Chapter 2, we incorporate
the concept of risk in the real options framework by constructing a utility-based
framework in order to examine the impact of risk aversion and uncertainty on
the optimal investment timing decisions of a risk-averse decision maker. We for-
mulate the problem using a nested optimal stopping time approach and a CRRA
utility function to determine the optimal time of investment that maximises the
decision maker’s expected utility of future proﬁts and examine the impact of
operational ﬂexibility in terms of having the ability to suspend and resume op-
erations at any time. Also, numerical examples that illustrate the interaction
among risk aversion, uncertainty, and operational ﬂexibility are provided for each
case. In Chapter 3, we assess how the ﬂexibility to adjust capacity impacts the
value of an option to invest. We extend the traditional real options approach
to investment under uncertainty with discretion over capacity by allowing for
risk aversion, through a CRRA utility function, and operational ﬂexibility in
the form of suspension and resumption options. In Chapter 4, we examine how
duopolistic competition aﬀects the entry decisions of risk-averse investors. We
also explore how the impact of competition on the value of a ﬁrm under two dif-
ferent oligopolistic frameworks varies with risk aversion and uncertainty. Chapter
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5 concludes with a discussion about the ﬁndings and limitations of the current
approaches. Future research recommendations in these areas are also provided.
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Chapter 2
Optimal Investment under
Operational Flexibility, Risk
Aversion, and Uncertainty
Fluctuating global economic conditions require responsive strategies in order to
ensure the eﬀectiveness of investment decisions. The withdrawal of Honda in 2008
from Formula One (Financial Times, 2008), for instance, was made in light of the
rapidly deteriorating conditions facing the global auto industry and reﬂects the
impact of the global ﬁnancial and economic crisis. Indeed, when market uncer-
tainty increases and decision makers are risk averse, the discretion to abandon,
modify, or suspend existing projects becomes of greater importance. Here, we ex-
amine the impact of such operational ﬂexibility, in terms of being able to suspend
and resume the project at any time, on optimal investment policies and option
values. We analyse the case where the decision maker exhibits risk aversion and
has perpetual options to suspend and resume a project at no cost. Under these
conditions, we address the question of how investment decisions are aﬀected by
risk aversion, operational ﬂexibility, and uncertainty. First, we develop a theo-
retical framework for investment under uncertainty with risk aversion and opera-
tional ﬂexibility in order to derive optimal investment and operational thresholds.
Second, we show how risk aversion interacts with operational ﬂexibility to aﬀect
optimal investment policy. Third, we provide managerial insights for operational
decisions based on analytical and numerical results.
29
2.1 Problem Formulation and Assumptions
We proceed in Section 2.1 by formulating the problem using the nested op-
timal stopping time approach and a CRRA utility function to determine the
optimal time of investment that maximises the decision maker’s expected utility
of future proﬁts. The impact of operational ﬂexibility, in terms of having the
ability to suspend and resume operations, is examined in Section 2.2. We ﬁrst
analyse the case where the investment is irreversible (2.2.1) and then introduce
operational ﬂexibility in the form of a single abandonment option (2.2.2), a com-
bined suspension-resumption option (2.2.3), and ﬁnally complete ﬂexibility where
the decision maker has an inﬁnite number of perpetual options to suspend and
resume operations (2.2.4). Section 2.3 provides numerical examples for each case
and examines the eﬀects of volatility and risk aversion on the optimal investment,
suspension, and resumption thresholds. We illustrate the interaction among risk
aversion, uncertainty, and operational ﬂexibility and present managerial insights
to enable more informed investment and operational decisions. Section 2.4 con-
cludes and oﬀers directions for future research.
2.1 Problem Formulation and Assumptions
We assume that a risk-averse decision maker holds the perpetual option to invest
in a project that yields stochastic revenues and produces a single unit of output
per annum over an inﬁnite lifetime. Prior to investment, the decision maker’s
initial wealth is invested in a risk-free asset with rate of return r > 0. Let K
be the amount of wealth the decision maker gives up in order to cover the ﬁxed
and irrecoverable cost of investment and c be the deterministic variable operating
cost of the project. As the operating cost, c, is incurred in perpetuity, the present
value of these costs at the time of investment equals K+
c
r
, which we assume is the
decision maker’s initial wealth. Also, time is continuous and denoted by t ≥ 0,
and the value of the project’s exogenous output price, P
t
, follows a geometric
Brownian motion (GBM) :
dP
t
= P
t
dt + P
t
dZ
t
, P
0
> 0 (2.1)
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Here,  is the growth rate,  is the proportional variance, Z
t
is the standard
Brownian motion, and P
0
is the initial value of the project’s output price. All
values and rates are expressed in real terms. The decision maker’s preferences are
described by an increasing and concave utility function, U(⋅). Hence, our analysis
can accommodate hyperbolic absolute risk aversion (HARA), constant absolute
risk aversion (CARA), and CRRA utility functions. To enable comparisons with
Hugonnier and Morellec (2007), we apply the same utility function, i.e., a CRRA
utility function:
U(P
t
) =
(
P
1−
t
1−
if  ≥ 0 &  ∕= 1
ln(P
t
) if  = 1
(2.2)
We follow the framework of Hugonnier and Morellec (2007) for decomposing
cash ﬂows into disjoint time intervals. We denote by P
(i)

j
the output price at
time 
j
, j = 1, 2, 3..., at which we exercise an investment (j = 1), suspension (j =
2, 4, 6, ...), or resumption option (j = 3, 5, 7, ...) when i = 0, 1, 2, 3... subsequent
embedded options exist. For example, P
(0)

1
is the price at which we exercise an
investment option without operational ﬂexibility, P
(0)

2
is the price at which we
exercise an abandonment option, and P
(1)

2
is the price at which we exercise a
suspension option with a resumption option still available, etc. Suppose now
that we have a perpetually operating project that we start at random time 
1
.
Thus, up to time 
1
, we earn an instantaneous cash ﬂow of c+ rK per time unit
with utility U(c+rK) discounted at our subjective rate of time preference,  > .
Once we invest in the project, we swap this certain cash ﬂow for a risky one, P
t
per time unit, with utility U(P
t
), as shown in Figure 2.1.
P
0

R

1
0
e
−t
U(c + rK)dt
-
R
∞

1
e
−t
U(P
t
)dt
-
P
(0)

1
-

1
∙∙
0 t
Figure 2.1: Irreversible investment under risk aversion
Using the law of iterated expectations and the strong Markov property of the
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GBM, which states that price values after time 
1
are independent of the val-
ues before 
1
and depend only on the value of the process at 
1
, the time-zero
discounted expected utility of the cash ﬂows is:
E
P
0

Z

1
0
e
−t
U(c + rK)dt +
Z
∞

1
e
−t
U(P
t
)dt

=
Z
∞
0
e
−t
U(c + rK)dt
+ E
P
0

e
−
1

V
1

P
(0)

1

(2.3)
where
V
1

P
(0)

1

= E
P
(0)

1

Z
∞
0
e
−t
[U (P
t
)− U (c + rK)] dt

(2.4)
is the expected utility of the project’s cash ﬂows, discounted to 
1
. Here, E
P
0
denotes the expectation operator, which is conditional on the initial value, P
0
, of
the price process and reﬂects the randomness of both 
1
and P
t
in 2.3.
Now, we extend this framework by allowing for an abandonment option at
random time 
2
> 
1
. The value of the output price at which the option to
abandon the project is exercised is denoted by P
(0)

2
, as shown in Figure 2.2.
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Figure 2.2: Investment under risk aversion with a single abandonment option
In this case, the expected discounted utility of all future cash ﬂows equals:
Z
∞
0
e
−t
U(c + rK)dt + E
P
0

e
−
1

h
V
1

P
(1)

1

+ E
P
(1)

1

e
−(
2
−
1
)

V
2

P
(0)

2

i
(2.5)
where
V
2

P
(0)

2

= E
P
(0)

2

Z
∞
0
e
−t
[U (c)− U (P
t
)] dt

(2.6)
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is the expected utility of the cash ﬂows from abandonment, discounted to 
2
.
Finally, we allow for a subsequent resumption option at random time 
3
> 
2
.
The output price at which the resumption option is exercised is denoted by P
(0)

3
as shown in Figure 2.3.
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Figure 2.3: Investment under risk aversion with one suspension and one resump-
tion option
Here, the expected discounted utility of all future cash ﬂows is:
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(2.7)
where
V
3

P
(0)

3

= E
P
(0)

3

Z
∞
0
e
−t
[U (P
t
)− U (c)] dt

(2.8)
is the expected utility of the cash ﬂows from resumption, discounted to 
3
. Follow-
ing the same reasoning, we can extend the model to include complete operational
ﬂexibility, i.e., inﬁnitely many suspension and resumption options.
2.2 Analytical Results
2.2.1 Investment without Operational Flexibility
Since this problem has already been examined by Hugonnier and Morellec (2007),
we summarise the results for ease of reference, to allow for comparisons, and to
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provide further insights. Let F
(i)

j
(⋅) denote the value of an option that is exercised
at time 
j
, j = 1, 2, 3, ..., with i = 0, 1, 2, 3, ... subsequent embedded options
remaining. F
(0)

1
(⋅) refers to an investment option without operational ﬂexibility,
F
(0)

2
(⋅) refers to an abandonment option, while F
(1)

2
(⋅) refers to a suspension
with one resumption option, and so on. We deﬁne the value of the incremental
investment opportunity, F
(0)

1
(P
0
), as follows:
F
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
1
(P
0
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
1
∈S
E
P
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e
−
1

V
1

P
(0)

1

(2.9)
By S, we denote the set of stopping times of the ﬁltration generated by the price
process.
Using Theorem 9.18 of Karatzas and Shreve (1999) for the CRRA utility
function in (2.2), we obtain Proposition 2.2.1. All proofs can be found in the
appendix.
Proposition 2.2.1 Under a CRRA utility-of-wealth function, the expected utility
of a perpetual GBM discounted to P
0
is given by 2.10:
E
P
0
Z
∞
0
e
−t
U(P
t
)dt = AU(P
0
) (2.10)
where A =

1

2
(1−
1
−)(1−
2
−)
> 0 and 
1
> 1, 
2
< 0 are the solutions to the
following quadratic equation:
1
2

2
x(x − 1) + x −  = 0 (2.11)
Since the expected discount factor is E
P
0
[e
−
1
] =

P
0
P
(0)

1


1
(Dixit and Pindyck,
1994, p.315), (2.9) can be written as follows:
F
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
1
(P
0
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(2.12)
Applying ﬁrst-order necessary condition (FONC) for this unconstrained maximi-
sation problem we obtain Proposition 2.2.2.
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Proposition 2.2.2 Under a CRRA utility-of-wealth function, the optimal in-
vestment threshold is:
P
(0)
∗

1
= (c + rK)


2
+  − 1

2

1
1−
(2.13)
The second-order suﬃciency condition (SOSC) requires the objective function to
be concave at P
(0)
∗

1
, which we show in Proposition 2.2.3.
Proposition 2.2.3 The objective function (2.9) is strictly concave at P
(0)
∗

1
iﬀ
 < 1.
Clearly, as
h

2
+−1

2
i
1
1−
> 1, this implies that P
(0)
∗

1
> c + rK. Thus, (2.13)
implies that the option to invest should be exercised only when the critical value,
P
(0)
∗

1
, exceeds the amortised investment cost, c + rK, by a positive quantity.
This, in turn, implies that uncertainty and risk aversion drive a wedge between
the optimal investment threshold and the amortised investment cost. The size
of this wedge, as we will show later, depends on the levels of uncertainty, risk
aversion, and operational ﬂexibility.
Another way of expressing (2.13) is to relate the marginal beneﬁt (MB) of
waiting to invest with its marginal cost (MC):
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(2.14)
The ﬁrst term on the left-hand side of (2.14) is positive and represents the in-
cremental project value created by waiting until the price is higher. Multiplied
by the discount factor, it is a positive, decreasing function of the output price,
as waiting longer enables the project to start at a higher initial price; however,
the rate at which this beneﬁt accrues diminishes due to the eﬀect of discounting.
The second term is positive and represents the reduction in the MC of waiting to
invest due to saved investment and operating costs. Together, these two terms
constitute the MB of delaying investment. The MC of waiting to invest on the
right-hand side of (2.14) is positive and reﬂects the opportunity cost of forgone
cash ﬂows discounted appropriately. For low price values, it is worthwhile to
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postpone investment since the MB is greater than the MC according to Corollary
2.2.1.
Corollary 2.2.1 The MB curve is steeper than the MC curve at P
(0)
∗

1
.
As risk aversion increases, the MC of waiting to invest decreases relatively more
than the MB. This happens because the MC consists entirely of risky cash ﬂows
and, therefore, is aﬀected more by risk aversion. As a result, the marginal utility
of the investment’s payoﬀ increases, thereby increasing the incentive to postpone
investment. This leads to Proposition 2.2.4.
Proposition 2.2.4 The optimal investment threshold is increasing with risk aver-
sion.
Finally, for a ﬁxed level of risk aversion, the optimal investment threshold in-
creases as the economic environment becomes more uncertain. This happens
because greater uncertainty causes the value of waiting to increase, which in
turn increases the opportunity cost of investing. Proposition 2.2.5 veriﬁes this
intuition.
Proposition 2.2.5 The optimal investment threshold is increasing with volatil-
ity.
2.2.2 Investment with a Single Abandonment Option
Here, the value of the investment opportunity is:
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(2.15)
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The value of the output price at which we exercise the abandonment option is
P
(0)

2
, and the maximised value of the option to abandon a just-activated project
is denoted by F
(0)

2

P
(1)

1

, i.e:
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We solve this compound real options problem backward by ﬁrst determining
the optimal abandonment threshold price, P
(0)
∗

2
. The FONC for this uncon-
strained maximisation problem is expressed as:

1
1− 
1
− 
P
(0)
∗

2
1−
+ c
1−
= 0 (2.17)
Solving (2.17) with respect to P
(0)
∗

2
, we obtain the following expression for the
optimal abandonment threshold:
P
(0)
∗

2
= c


1
+  − 1

1

1
1−
(2.18)
To ensure the existence of a local maximum at P
(0)
∗

2
, the SOSC has to be veriﬁed.
Proposition 2.2.6 The objective function (2.16) is strictly concave at P
(0)
∗

2
iﬀ
 < 1.
Since
h

1
+−1

1
i
1
1−
< 1, (2.18) implies that P
(0)
∗

2
< c, i.e., the option to abandon
operations permanently should be exercised when the operating cost, c, exceeds
the critical value, P
(0)
∗

2
, by a positive quantity. Hence, uncertainty and risk aver-
sion again drive a wedge between the critical value, P
(0)
∗

2
, and the operating cost,
c. The size of this wedge is aﬀected by volatility, risk aversion, and operational
ﬂexibility.
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In contrast to the previous section, we now express (2.17) by relating the MB
from accelerating abandonment of the project with the MC. Note that unlike in
the investment stage, an incremental increase in the threshold value implies that
abandonment is accelerated:
−
 
P
(1)

1
P
(0)
∗

2
!

2

2
P
(0)
∗

2
U(c)

=
 
P
(1)

1
P
(0)
∗

2
!

2
"
AP
(0)
∗

2
−
−

2
A
P
(0)
∗

2
U

P
(0)
∗

2

#
(2.19)
The left-hand side of (2.19) is the MB of accelerating abandonment and represents
the recovery of the operating cost from shutting down the project. This term is
positive, indicating that abandoning operations at a higher price level (i.e., more
quickly) increases the expected utility of the salvageable operating cost. The
right-hand side of (2.19) is the MC of accelerating abandonment. The ﬁrst term
corresponds to killing the revenues of the project at a higher price level, while
the second term is also positive and corresponds to the increase in the MC from
speeding up abandonment. This term represents the increase in the opportunity
cost from waiting less, thereby forgoing information. As risk aversion increases,
the decision maker appears more willing to terminate operations and, thus, avoid
potential losses as Proposition 2.2.7 states.
Proposition 2.2.7 The optimal abandonment threshold is increasing with risk
aversion.
The behaviour of the optimal abandonment threshold when the level of un-
certainty changes can be determined using the FONC with respect to 
2
. This
leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 2.2.8 The optimal abandonment threshold is decreasing with volatil-
ity.
Proposition 2.2.8 implies that the greater the uncertainty, the more reluctant the
decision maker is to abandon an active project. Intuitively, this happens because
she would not want to abandon the project due to a temporary downturn, which
is more likely when volatility is higher.
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By moving back to the investment stage, we now solve the decision maker’s
investment timing problem given the solution to the optimal exercise of the aban-
donment option:
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Substituting in P
(0)
∗

2
and applying the FONC to (2.20) leads to the following
non-linear equation that gives the optimal investment threshold:

2
1− 
2
− 
P
(1)
∗

1
1−
+ (c + rK)
1−
−
(
1
− 
2
)

1
(1− )F
(0)

2

P
(1)
∗

1

= 0 (2.21)
By comparing (2.21) and (2.13), we can show that the optimal investment thresh-
old decreases due to the embedded abandonment option as follows:
Proposition 2.2.9 The optimal investment threshold when an abandonment op-
tion is available is lower compared to an irreversible investment opportunity, ce-
teris paribus.
In order to illustrate Proposition 2.2.9, we express (2.21) by relating the MB
of waiting to invest to the MC as shown in (2.22).
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Compared to the case of investment without operational ﬂexibility (2.14), the
MB and MC of delaying investment have now increased due to the additional
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terms on each side of (2.22). These terms are positive and correspond to the MB
and MC from the embedded abandonment option. In fact, the MC increases by
more than the MB since, at abandonment, the expected utility of the salvageable
operating cost is greater than the expected utility of the forgone cash ﬂows. Thus,
the marginal utility of the payoﬀ from delaying investment decreases, thereby
increasing the incentive to invest. Intuitively, the abandonment option reduces
the decision maker’s insecurity since she can now terminate her investment in
case the output price drops signiﬁcantly.
2.2.3 Investment with a Single Suspension and Resump-
tion Option
With a single suspension and resumption option, the value of the investment
opportunity is:
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Here, P
(1)

2
is the threshold price at which we suspend the investment project.
The last term, F
(1)

2

P
(2)

1

, is the maximised value of the option to suspend a
just-activated project with a subsequent resumption option and is deﬁned as:
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Analogously, we deﬁne F
(0)

3

P
(1)

2

to be the maximised value of the option to
resume forever a just-suspended project, and P
(0)

3
the threshold price at which
we exercise the option to resume the investment project:
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We solve this compound real options problem backward by ﬁrst determining
the optimal resumption threshold price. The FONC yields:
P
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3
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
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
2
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(2.26)
Diﬀerentiating (2.26) with respect to , we obtain the following proposition:
Proposition 2.2.10 The optimal resumption threshold is increasing with risk
aversion.
Next, we step back to when the investment project is active in order to de-
cide when to suspend operations, i.e., sub-problem (2.24). Applying the FONC,
we obtain the following non-linear equation that gives the optimal suspension
threshold:
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Proposition 2.2.11 The optimal suspension threshold is higher than the optimal
abandonment one.
To illustrate Proposition 2.2.11, we will examine the relationship between the
MB from accelerating suspension and its MC, which is described in the following
equation:
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The left-hand side of (2.28) is the MB of accelerating suspension. The ﬁrst term
is the MB of accelerating abandonment, while the second term represents the
MB from the embedded resumption option. Since the latter term is positive,
the MB of suspension has increased compared to the case of abandonment in
(2.19). The right-hand side of (2.28) is the MC of accelerating suspension. The
ﬁrst two terms correspond to the MC of accelerating abandonment, while the
third term represents the MC from the embedded option to resume operations.
Since this term is always positive, it causes the MC of abandonment to increase.
Although both the MB and MC increase due to the embedded resumption option,
the former increases relatively more since at resumption, the expected utility of
the risky cash ﬂows is greater than the expected utility of the operating cost.
Thus, the marginal utility of the payoﬀ from suspending operations increases,
which in turn increases the incentive to suspend operations. As a result, MB and
MC curves intersect at a higher level of the output price, thereby indicating that
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the embedded resumption option facilitates suspension. Intuitively, the decision
maker is more willing to suspend operations since now, unlike in the case of
permanent abandonment, she can recover the lost cash ﬂows by exercising her
resumption option.
Finally, we move to the investment stage to solve the complete problem taking
P
(0)
∗

3
and P
(1)
∗
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2
as ﬁxed:
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The optimal investment threshold is obtained numerically by solving the following
non-linear equation resulting from the FONC:
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= 0 (2.30)
Proposition 2.2.12 The optimal investment threshold when a single suspension
and a single resumption option are available is lower than for an investment
opportunity with a single abandonment option.
Intuitively, the suspension and resumption options facilitate investment because
they provide the decision maker the subsequent option to halt the project in
case of a downturn and then to resume it. Propositions 2.2.11 and 2.2.12 lead
to the insight that additional ﬂexibility facilitates investment and operational
decisions, thereby resulting in an increase of the optimal suspension threshold
and a decrease of the optimal investment threshold.
2.2.4 Investment with Complete Operational Flexibility
Following the methodology of McDonald (2006), suppose that we are now oper-
ating an investment project with inﬁnitely many perpetual options to suspend
and resume operations. The symmetry of the problem suggests that the optimal
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values of the output prices at which these options are exercised will not be af-
fected by additional ﬂexibility, i.e., each time we suspend or resume operations,
we still have inﬁnitely many options left. Therefore, each resumption and suspen-
sion threshold will be aﬀected equally by ﬂexibility. We let P
(∞)

e
, where e stands
for even (i.e., 2,4,6,...), denote the common threshold at which all suspension
options are exercised, and P
(∞)

o
, where o stands for odd (i.e., 3,5,7,...), denote
the common threshold at which all resumption options are exercised. Hence, the
value of an operating project activated at P
(∞)

o
can be written as follows:
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Therefore, the decision maker’s problem in an active state is:
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It follows that the option to resume a currently suspended project with inﬁnitely
many resumption and suspension options, given that the current value of the
output price is P
(∞)

e
, is:
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In order to solve for P
(∞)
∗

1
, P
(∞)
∗

o
, and P
(∞)
∗

e
, we ﬁrst substitute (2.33) into
(2.34) and use as an initial guess for P
(∞)

e
the price at which the option to aban-
don the investment project is exercised, i.e., P
(∞)

e
= P
(0)
∗

2
. Thus, we obtain an
equation that we then maximise with respect to P
(∞)

o
. The estimate of P
(∞)

o
we obtain this way is then substituted into (2.33), which we maximise with re-
spect to P
(∞)

e
. This procedure is iterated until each solution converges. As we will
demonstrate numerically in Section 2.3.4, the optimal suspension and resumption
thresholds converge toward the operating cost, c. Intuitively, each time that ad-
ditional ﬂexibility becomes available, the optimal suspension threshold increases
and the optimal resumption threshold decreases. Assuming that P
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2j
< c and
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
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> c, ∀ i < ∞ and ∀ j = 1, 2, 3, ..., this implies that lim
i→∞
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= c, ∀j.
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solve the investment problem for investment threshold, P
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, assuming invest-
ment cost, K:
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2.3 Numerical Results
2.3.1 Investment without Operational Flexibility
Suppose we have a project with K = $100, c = $10,  ∈ [0, 0.2], and P
0
= $13.6.
We set r =  = 0.05 and  = 0.01. Figure 2.4 shows that the investment thresh-
old, P
(0)
∗

1
, increases in risk aversion, , for a ﬁxed volatility, . This happens
because the underlying expected utility of the project decreases with , thereby
raising the required threshold for investment. Hence, increased risk aversion re-
duces the incentive to invest. Second, P
(0)
∗

1
increases in  for ﬁxed  because
greater uncertainty increases the value of waiting and, thus, the opportunity cost
of investing.
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Figure 2.4: Optimal investment threshold versus  for  = 0.1, 0.15, 0.2 (left),
and optimal investment threshold versus  for  = 0, 0.25, 0.5 (right).
Figure 2.5 illustrates the MB and MC of waiting to invest, for  = 0.2 and
 = 0, 0.25. For low prices, it is worthwhile to postpone investment as the MB is
greater than the MC. As risk aversion increases, the MC, which consists entirely
of risky cash ﬂows and, hence, gets aﬀected more by risk aversion, decreases by
more than the MB. As a result, the marginal utility of the payoﬀ when investment
is delayed increases, which, in turn, decreases the incentive to invest and causes
the optimal investment threshold to increase with risk aversion.
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Figure 2.5: Marginal beneﬁt versus marginal cost under risk neutrality (left) and
risk aversion,  = 0.25, (right) for an irreversible investment opportunity
46
2.3 Numerical Results
Figure 2.6 illustrates the impact of volatility, , and risk aversion, , on the
value of the option to invest and the value of the project. In the graph on the left,
we plot the value of the project as well as the option value for  = 0.1, 0.15, 0.2
holding  = 0.25. As uncertainty increases, the project value decreases, but the
value of the option to invest, evaluated at the initial level of the output price,
increases due to greater waiting value. Consequently, the value of the option to
wait also increases, thereby increasing the investment threshold. In the graph on
the right, we plot the value of the project and the option value for  = 0, 0.25, 0.5
holding  = 0.2. The graph indicates that as risk aversion increases, the decision
maker requires a higher price before exercising the option to invest. This is due
to the decreased expected utility of the project, which decreases the value of the
option to invest and increases the investment threshold.
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
−50
0
50
100
150
Output price, P
t
P
r
o
j
e
c
t
V
a
l
u
e
,
O
p
t
i
o
n
V
a
l
u
e
(
u
t
i
l
s
)
Option Value
Project Value
Option Value at P
0
Optimal Investment Threshold
σ = 0.2
σ = 0.1
σ = 0.15
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
−300
−200
−100
0
100
200
300
400
500
Output price, P
t
P
r
o
j
e
c
t
V
a
l
u
e
,
O
p
t
i
o
n
V
a
l
u
e
(
u
t
i
l
s
)
γ = 0.25
γ = 0
γ = 0.5
Option Value
Project Value
Optimal Investment Threshold
Figure 2.6: Option value and project value versus P
t
for  = 0.25 and  =
0.1, 0.15, 0.2 (left), and option value and project value versus P
t
for  = 0.2 and
 = 0, 0.25, 0.5 (right)
2.3.2 Investment with a Single Abandonment Option
Increasing ﬂexibility by adding an abandonment option decreases the optimal
investment threshold. The proportional increase in option value due to the sub-
sequent abandonment option is larger for higher levels of uncertainty and risk
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aversion. Both of these results are illustrated in Figure 2.7. In the graph on the
left, we compare the case of investment without operational ﬂexibility to that of
investment with a single abandonment option. We plot the value of the project
and the value of the investment opportunity for  = 0.25 and  = 0.2. The graph
on the right illustrates how the proportional increase in option value due to the
subsequent abandonment option ﬂuctuates with risk aversion for three levels of
volatility.
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Figure 2.7: Eﬀect of the abandonment option on optimal investment threshold
and option value
Although both risk aversion and uncertainty increase the option value of aban-
donment, the impact of each factor on P
(0)
∗

2
is diﬀerent. While risk aversion in-
creases the abandonment threshold due to a decrease in project value, uncertainty
lowers the abandonment threshold because it increases its opportunity cost. In
particular, Figure 2.8 indicates that as risk aversion increases, for a ﬁxed level
of volatility, the decision maker becomes more willing to abandon the project in
order to avoid potential losses. An increase in uncertainty, however, leads to a
decrease in the optimal abandonment threshold.
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For large price values, the MB of accelerating abandonment is less than the
MC, and, therefore, it is optimal to continue, as Figure 2.9 illustrates. As risk
aversion increases, both the MB and MC of accelerating abandonment decrease.
However, the MC, which consists entirely of risky cash ﬂows and, therefore, gets
aﬀected more by risk aversion, decreases relatively more. As a result, the marginal
utility of the payoﬀ from accelerating abandonment increases, which, in turn,
increases the incentive to abandon the project and results in an increased optimal
abandonment threshold.
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Figure 2.9: Marginal beneﬁt versus marginal cost under risk neutrality (left) and
risk aversion,  = 0.25, (right) for an irreversible abandonment opportunity
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Using the same parameter values as in Section 2.3.1, we plot the MB and
MC of waiting to invest versus P
t
. The embedded abandonment option causes
the marginal utility of the payoﬀ from delaying investment to decrease, which, in
turn, increases the incentive to invest. This happens because the MC increases
relatively more than the MB, and as a result, the MB and MC curves intersect
at a lower level of P
(1)
∗

1
, as Figure 2.10 illustrates.
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Figure 2.10: Marginal beneﬁt versus marginal cost under risk neutrality (left) and
risk aversion,  = 0.25 (right) for an investment opportunity with an embedded
abandonment option
2.3.3 Investment with a Single Suspension and a Single
Resumption Option
Having the option to suspend operations combined with an option to resume
them permanently increases the value of the investment opportunity further and
decreases the optimal investment threshold as the left panel in Figure 2.11 illus-
trates. Moreover, the percentage increase in option value due to the subsequent
resumption option is greater compared to the case of investment with a single
abandonment option, i.e.,
F
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Figure 2.11: Eﬀect of the resumption option on optimal investment threshold and
option value
In Figure 2.12, we illustrate the impact of the additional resumption option on
the MB and MC of waiting to invest. The embedded resumption option increases
the MC relatively more than the MB, and, as a result, the marginal utility of
the payoﬀ decreases further, thereby increasing the incentive to invest. Thus, the
MB and MC curves intersect at a lower level of the output price compared to the
case of investment with abandonment.
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Figure 2.12: Marginal beneﬁt versus marginal cost under risk neutrality (left) and
risk aversion,  = 0.25, (right) for an investment opportunity with a suspension
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Interestingly, the results also indicate that the decision maker is less willing
to suspend operations as the level of risk aversion increases. This outcome may
seem counterintuitive, but it can be explained by the fact that as risk aversion
increases, the following two opposing eﬀects take place. First, the marginal utility
of accelerating suspension increases with risk aversion, thereby increasing the like-
lihood of suspension. This happens because the MC of the abandonment option
decreases faster with risk aversion than the MB. Second, the marginal utility of
delaying resumption from a suspended state increases with risk aversion, thereby
decreasing the likelihood of resumption. Here, the MC of the embedded resump-
tion option decreases faster than the MB. Thus, higher risk aversion reduces the
marginal value of the payoﬀ from the resumption option, which makes suspen-
sion less attractive. Under the assumption of costless suspension and resumption
and for the values of the parameters used here, we observe that the impact of
risk aversion on the embedded resumption option dominates and postpones the
suspension of the project. Figure 2.13 illustrates the impact of risk aversion and
uncertainty on the optimal suspension threshold. The graph on the left indicates
that as risk aversion increases, the wedge between the MB of suspension and
the MB of abandonment decreases, thereby indicating that the impact of risk
aversion on the embedded resumption option is more profound and results in the
decreased likelihood of suspension. On the other hand, as in the previous section,
the suspension threshold decreases with uncertainty since the decision maker is
inclined to wait for uncertainty to be resolved before exercising the suspension
option.
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Figure 2.13: MB and MC of abandonment versus MB and MC of suspension for
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 = 0.1, 0.2, 0.15 (right)
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Also interesting is that by allowing a further abandonment option after re-
sumption, the aforementioned counterintuitive result is no longer observed. Due
to the additional abandonment option, the marginal utility of the payoﬀ from the
option to suspend operations increases faster with risk aversion than in the case
of suspension with a subsequent option of permanent resumption. In particular,
the rate of this increase is greater than the rate at which the marginal utility of
the payoﬀ from the embedded call option increases. Hence, the impact of risk
aversion on the embedded suspension and abandonment options is now greater
than that on the single resumption option and, thus, causes the likelihood of
suspension to increase with risk aversion. In fact, we observe that the impact of
risk aversion on an optimal suspension threshold dominates when the number of
subsequent options to suspend operations exceeds the number of the options to
resume them.
Figure 2.14 summarises the impact of operational ﬂexibility and risk aversion
on the optimal decision thresholds. The direction of the arrows indicates greater
operational ﬂexibility. Here, additional ﬂexibility facilitates all operational deci-
sions and causes the optimal investment and resumption thresholds to decrease
and the optimal suspension threshold to increase. Meanwhile, the impact of
risk aversion on the optimal investment and operational thresholds diminishes as
additional ﬂexibility becomes available.
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Figure 2.14: Impact of operational ﬂexibility and risk aversion on optimal decision
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2.3.4 Investment with Complete Operational Flexibility
In Figure 2.15, the left ﬁgure compares the case of investment with complete
ﬂexibility to that of investment with a single suspension and a single resumption
option for  = 0.2 and  = 0.25. Now, the ability to suspend and resume opera-
tions at any time increases the value of the investment opportunity, which reduces
further the investment threshold price. Also, the proportional increase in option
value is greater than that in the case of investment with a single suspension and a
single resumption option as the ﬁgure on the right illustrates. Finally, according
to the numerical results, the optimal suspension and optimal resumption thresh-
olds under complete ﬂexibility are equal to the operating cost, c. Intuitively,
additional ﬂexibility facilitates the suspension and resumption of the investment
project and, as a result, causes the optimal suspension threshold to increase and
the optimal resumption threshold to decrease. Assuming that no rational decision
maker would exercise a suspension option at P
(i)

2j
> c and a resumption option
at P
(i)

2j+1
< c, we can expect both of these thresholds to converge toward the
operating cost as additional ﬂexibility becomes available. Thus, as i → ∞, we
expect that P
(i)

2j
→ c and P
(i)

2j+1
→ c. Hence, the ability to suspend and resume
operations costlessly at any time completely mitigates the impact of risk aversion
and volatility on the optimal operational thresholds and drives them to the same
level as in the risk-neutral case.
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2.4 Conclusions
In a world of increasing economic uncertainty, the need to examine the interaction
between risk aversion and operational ﬂexibility, so as to provide optimal invest-
ment and operational decisions, is of great essence. In this chapter, an eﬀort is
made to extend the results of McDonald and Siegel (1985, 1986) and Hugonnier
and Morellec (2007) to examine how investment and operational decisions are
aﬀected by situations of uncertainty encountered by risk-averse decision makers.
Although the impact of risk aversion has already been demonstrated in Hugonnier
and Morellec (2007), its implications when combined with operational ﬂexibility
have not been thoroughly examined yet. Here, we develop the results regarding
the problem of optimal investment under the assumption of risk aversion and op-
erational ﬂexibility assuming that the decision maker faces incomplete markets.
We demonstrate how operational ﬂexibility facilitates investment and operational
decisions by increasing the likelihood of investment, suspension, and resumption
of the investment project. We show that risk aversion provides an incentive for
decision makers to delay the investment and resumption of the investment project
and speed up their decision to abandon it. Moreover, we describe how an envi-
ronment of increasing uncertainty may aﬀect the optimal investment policy and
lead to hysteresis. Also, we provide insights regarding the behaviour of the op-
timal suspension threshold when the level of risk aversion changes. Finally, we
demonstrate how operational ﬂexibility becomes more valuable as risk aversion
increases and the economic environment becomes more volatile.
In order to test the robustness of the model, we can either apply a diﬀer-
ent stochastic process, such as arithmetic Brownian motion or a mean-reverting
process, or an alternative utility function. Other aspects of the real options liter-
ature, e.g., dealing with endogenous capacity (Dangl, 1999) and the time-to-build
problem, may also be investigated under the framework outlined in this chapter.
In Chapter 3, we assume that apart from the option to choose the optimal time
of investment, a ﬁrm also has the freedom to scale the capacity of the project.
Incorporating the same utility-based framework as in Chapter 2, we analyse how
investment and sizing decisions are aﬀected by risk aversion and uncertainty.
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Chapter 3
The Value of Capacity Sizing
under Risk Aversion and
Operational Flexibility
Apart from discretion over the timing of investments, a ﬁrm typically also has
the freedom to determine the scale of the investment in the form of installed
capacity. Additionally, capital projects are seldom now-or-never investments and
can be abandoned, suspended, and resumed at any time. Examples of such real
options problems can be found in the area of infrastructure projects. For instance,
in the area of American railways, investment in freight railway capacity will be
needed as capacity will have to increase by 90% in order to meet forecast demand
of 2035. Among other reasons, this is also due to the change in the pattern of
trade as the Panama canal opens a second lane, thereby doubling its capacity
and allowing it to carry bigger container vessels and bulk ships. Coming through
to Gulf of Mexico and East Coast ports, these vessels will increase the need for
better rail links inland (The Economist, 2010).
Although the traditional real options approach addresses the value of ﬂexibil-
ity and capacity sizing in capital budgeting decisions, the interaction between an
investor’s risk tolerance and the optimal capacity to be installed remains an open
question. In this chapter, we analyse the impact of uncertainty, risk aversion, and
operational ﬂexibility on the optimal investment timing and sizing decisions of a
ﬁrm in order to assess the degree to which discretion over capacity impacts the
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value of the option to invest. Thus, the contribution of Chapter 3 is threefold.
First, we develop a theoretical framework for investment with capacity sizing
under uncertainty with risk aversion and operational ﬂexibility, and we derive
closed-form expressions for the optimal investment and operational thresholds
as well as the project’s optimal capacity. Second, we illustrate how the opti-
mal investment timing and sizing decisions are aﬀected by the interaction among
risk aversion, volatility, and operational ﬂexibility. Third, we provide managerial
insights for sizing and operational decisions based on analytical and numerical
results.
We proceed by setting up the problem in Section 3.1. In Section 3.2, we anal-
yse the impact of uncertainty and risk aversion on the optimal investment timing
and sizing decisions when investment is irreversible, and assess how the option
value changes due to discretion over capacity. We use a nested optimal stopping-
time approach to examine the impact of embedded abandonment, suspension, and
resumption options. In Section 3.3, we provide numerical examples for each case
in order to quantify the impact of capacity ﬂexibility and to illustrate the eﬀects
of volatility and risk aversion on the optimal investment threshold and optimal
capacity. Finally, Section 3.4 concludes the chapter, discusses its limitations, and
oﬀers directions for future research.
3.1 Setup
3.1.1 Problem Formulation and Notation
Assume that a ﬁrm holds a perpetual option to invest in a project with an inﬁnite
lifetime that yields stochastic revenues. Time is continuous and denoted by t ≥ 0,
and the output price at time t, P
t
($/unit), follows a GBM:
dP
t
= P
t
dt + P
t
dZ
t
, P
0
> 0 (3.1)
Here,  is the annual growth rate,  is the proportional standard deviation, dZ
t
is an increment of the standard Brownian motion process, and P
0
is the initial
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value of the output price. Initially, the capital required for the realisation of the
project is invested in a bond with a risk-free rate r > 0.
We denote by P
(i)

j
the output price at time 
j
, j = 1, 2, 3, ..., at which we
exercise an investment (j = 1), suspension (j = 2, 4, 6, ...), or resumption option
(j = 3, 5, 7, ...) when i = 0, 1, 2, 3, ..., subsequent embedded options exist. For
example, P
(0)

1
is the price at which we exercise an investment option without
operational ﬂexibility, P
(0)

2
is the price at which we exercise an abandonment
option, and P
(1)

2
is the price at which we exercise a suspension option with a
resumption option still available, etc. Depending on the level of operational ﬂex-
ibility and the output price at investment, we denote by m˜
(i)
(⋅) (units/annum),
the annual output corresponding to a now-or-never investment opportunity, and
by m
(i)
(⋅) the annual output of the project when the option to defer investment
is available. The value of an opportunity that is exercised at time 
j
, with i
subsequent embedded options remaining, is denoted by F
(i)

j
(⋅), while
˜
F
(i)
(⋅) de-
notes the maximised value of a now-or-never investment opportunity. Exercising
this investment opportunity implies knowledge of the output price at investment
and, for this reason, the only variable is the capacity corresponding to the initial
output price.
Finally, the deterministic variable operating cost of the project is denoted by
c ($/unit), and the deterministic cost of investment by K

m
(i)

or K

m˜
(i)

($),
which we assume behaves as follows:
K

m
(i)

= bm
(i)

(3.2)
The parameters b and  are constants such that b > 0 and  > 1, i.e., K (⋅) is a
convex function of m
(i)
or m˜
(i)
. The particular choice of  implies an increasing
average cost and, as a result, this model is more suitable for describing project
that exhibit diseconomies of scale, e.g., renewable-energy power plants. All values
and rates are expressed in real terms. The present value of the investment’s total
cost, i.e., investment and operating cost, at investment equals K

m
(i)

+
cm
(i)
r
.
Depending on the project’s operational ﬂexibility, the ﬁrm can determine the
optimal investment threshold as well as the corresponding output of the project
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ex ante, and, thus, determine the amount of wealth that should be invested
initially in the risk-free asset.
The ﬁrm’s preferences are described by an increasing and concave utility func-
tion, U(⋅). Thus, we can accommodate a wide range of utility functions such as
HARA, CARA, and CRRA utility functions. In our analysis, we apply a CRRA
utility function deﬁned as follows:
U(P
t
) =
(
P
1−
t
1−
if  ≥ 0 &  ∕= 1
ln(P
t
) if  = 1
(3.3)
3.1.2 Irreversible Investment
We begin by decomposing the cash ﬂows into disjoint time intervals. Suppose that
we have a perpetually operating project that we start at a random time, 
1
. As
the capacity of the project is ﬁxed at investment, it depends on the output price
at 
1
, i.e., m
(0)
≡ m
(0)

P
(0)

1

. Up to time 
1
, the ﬁrm earns an instantaneous
cash ﬂow of cm
(0)
+ rK

m
(0)

per time unit with utility U

cm
(0)
+ rK

m
(0)

discounted at its subjective rate of time preference,  > . At 
1
, when the
output price is P
(0)

1
, the ﬁrm swaps this risk-free cash ﬂow for a risky one, m
(0)
P
t
,
with utility U

m
(0)
P
t

as illustrated in Figure 3.1.
P
0

R

1
0
e
−t
U

cm
(0)
+ rK

m
(0)

dt
-
R
∞

1
e
−t
U

m
(0)
P
t

dt
-
P
(0)

1
, m
(0)
-

1
∙
0
∙
t
Figure 3.1: Irreversible investment under risk aversion
The time-zero discounted expected utility of the cash ﬂows is:
E
P
0

Z

1
0
e
−t
U

cm
(0)
+ rK

m
(0)

dt +
Z
∞

1
e
−t
U

m
(0)
P
t

dt

=
Z
∞
0
e
−t
U

cm
0
+ rK

m
(0)

dt + E
P
0

e
−
1

V
1

P
(0)

1
, m
(0)

(3.4)
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where,
V
1

P
(0)

1
, m
(0)

= E
P
(0)

1

Z
∞
0
e
−t

U

m
(0)
P
t

− U

cm
(0)
+ rK

m
(0)

dt

(3.5)
is the expected utility of the project’s cash ﬂows, discounted to 
1
, given a capacity
of m
(0)
. Here, E
P
0
denotes the expectation operator, which is conditional on the
initial value of the price process.
3.1.3 Investment with a Single Abandonment Option
Now, we extend the previous framework and incorporate operational ﬂexibility
by allowing for an abandonment option at a random time, 
2
> 
1
. Again,
the capacity of the project is ﬁxed at investment and, thus, depends on P
(1)

1
, i.e.,
m
(1)
≡ m
(1)

P
(1)

1

. The value of the output price at which the option to abandon
the project is exercised is denoted by P
(0)

2
as shown in Figure 3.2. In this case,
the time-zero expected discounted utility of all future cash ﬂows equals:
Z
∞
0
e
−t
U

cm
(1)
+ rK

m
(1)

dt + E
P
0

e
−
1

h
V
1

P
(1)

1
, m
(1)

+ E
P
(1)

1

e
−(
2
−
1
)

V
2

P
(0)

2
, m
(1)

i
(3.6)
where
V
2

P
(0)

2
, m
(1)

= E
P
(0)

2

Z
∞
0
e
−t

U

cm
(1)

− U

m
(1)
P
t

dt

(3.7)
is the expected utility of the project’s cash ﬂows discounted to 
2
. Notice that
the operating cost of the project is recovered upon abandonment.
P
0

R

1
0
e
−t
U

cm
(1)
+ rK

m
(1)

dt
-
R

2

1
e
−t
U

m
(1)
P
t

dt
-
P
(1)

1
, m
(1)
-

1
∙
P
(0)

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
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U

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
dt
-

2
∙
0
∙
t
Figure 3.2: Investment under risk aversion with a single abandonment option
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3.1.4 Investment with a Single Suspension and a Single
Resumption Option
Finally, we allow for a subsequent resumption option at random time, 
3
> 
2
.
The capacity of the project now depends on P
(2)

1
, i.e., m
(2)
≡ m
(2)

P
(2)

1

, where
the output price at which the resumption option is exercised is denoted by P
(0)

3
as shown in Figure 3.3.
Figure 3.3: Investment under risk aversion with one suspension and one resump-
tion option
Here, the time-zero expected discounted utility of all future cash ﬂows is:
Z
∞
0
e
−t
U

cm
(2)
+ rK

m
(2)

dt + E
P
0

e
−
1

h
V
1

P
(2)

1
, m
(2)

+ E
P
(2)

1

e
−(
2
−
1
)

h
V
2

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(1)

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, m
(2)

+ E
P
(1)

2

e
−(
3
−
2
)

V
3

P
(0)

3
, m
(2)

i i
(3.8)
where
V
3

P
(0)

3
, m
(2)

= E
P
(0)

3

Z
∞
0
e
−t

U

m
(2)
P
t

− U

cm
(2)

dt

(3.9)
is the expected utility of the project’s cash ﬂows discounted to 
3
. Following
the same reasoning, we can extend the model to include complete operational
ﬂexibility, i.e., inﬁnite suspension and resumption options.
3.1.5 Methodology
Our methodology to determine the optimal investment threshold and capacity of
the project is described in Figure 3.4. Initially, we assume that investment oc-
curs immediately, which implies knowledge of the output price at investment and
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enables the calculation of the corresponding optimal capacity by maximising the
value of the now-or-never investment opportunity. At the optimal capacity choice,
the marginal beneﬁt of increasing capacity,
g
MB, equals the marginal cost,
g
MC.
This yields the expression relating the initial output price, P
0
, to the correspond-
ing optimal capacity, i.e., m˜
(i)
∗
≡ m˜
(i)
(P
0
). We then account for the option to
defer investment and maximise the value of the investment opportunity by deter-
mining the optimal investment threshold taking into account the inner extremum
of optimal capacity choice at investment. The solution to this optimisation prob-
lem is obtained by equating the marginal beneﬁt of delaying investment, MB, to
the marginal cost, MC. Thus, we obtain the expression relating the optimal in-
vestment threshold with the optimal capacity, i.e., P
(i)
∗

1
≡ P
(i)

1

m
(i)
∗

. Inserting
this expression into the condition of optimal capacity choice at 
1
, we obtain the
optimal capacity of the project, i.e., m
(i)
∗
≡ m
(i)

P
(i)
∗

1

. Finally, using m
(i)
∗
,
we can determine the corresponding optimal investment threshold price, P
(i)
∗

1
. If
P
0
exceeds P
(i)
∗

1
, then we invest immediately and install capacity of size m˜
(i)
∗
.
Otherwise, we wait for the threshold price, P
(i)
∗

1
, to be reached before investing
in a project of size m
(i)
∗
3.2 Analytical Results
3.2.1 Capacity Choice for an Irreversible Investment Op-
portunity
3.2.1.1 Now-or-Never Investment
Initially, we assume that the ﬁrm ignores the option to wait for more informa-
tion and invests in the project immediately at the initial output price. This
assumption implies that, at investment, the output price, P
0
, is known, and, for
this reason, the ﬁrm needs to determine only the corresponding optimal capac-
ity, m˜
(0)
∗
. Hence, the decision-making problem the ﬁrm faces when exercising a
now-or-never investment opportunity is described by (3.10):
˜
F
(0)
(P
0
) ≡ max
m˜
(0)
V
1

P
0
, m˜
(0)

(3.10)
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Now-or-Never Investment
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Figure 3.4: Summary of methodology
Using Theorem 9.18 of Karatzas and Shreve (1999) for the CRRA utility
function in (3.3), we ﬁnd that:
E
P
0
Z
∞
0
e
−t
U

m˜
(i)
P
t

dt = AU

m˜
(i)
P
0

(3.11)
where A =

1

2
(1−
1
−)(1−
2
−)
> 0 and 
1
> 1, 
2
< 0 are the solutions to the
following quadratic equation for x:
1
2

2
x(x − 1) + x −  = 0 (3.12)
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Consequently, (3.10) can be written as follows:
˜
F
(0)
(P
0
) = max
m˜
(0)
(
AU

m˜
(0)
P
0

−
U

cm˜
(0)
+ rK

m˜
(0)


)
(3.13)
At the optimal capacity level, m˜
(0)
∗
, the marginal beneﬁt of a unit increase in
the project’s capacity evaluated at P
0
,
g
MB, has to be equal to the marginal cost,
g
MC, which yields (3.14):
AP
0
1−
m˜
(0)
∗

=
c + rbm˜
(0)
∗
−1

h
cm˜
(0)
∗
+ rbm˜
(0)
∗

i

(3.14)
The left-hand side of (3.14) is the
g
MB of increasing capacity, which, due to the
property of diminishing marginal utility of the CRRA utility function, is positive
and constant in m˜
(0)
under risk neutrality but decreasing under risk aversion. The
right-hand side of (3.14) represents the
g
MC of increasing capacity. Notice that,
under risk neutrality, the cost function, i.e., cm˜
(0)
+ rbm˜
(0)

, is strictly convex in
capacity; however, as risk aversion increases, the concavity of the utility function
oﬀsets the convexity of the cost function, which implies that, under risk neutrality,
the
g
MC is strictly increasing in m˜
(0)
, while as risk aversion increases it decreases
initially and then increases. To ensure the existence of the optimal solution to
(3.13), the cost function must be strictly convex since, according to Proposition
3.2.1, for  ↓ 1 the
g
MC curve is steeper than the
g
MB curve. This implies
that a marginal increase in capacity reduces the marginal cost by more than the
marginal beneﬁt and, as a result, it is always optimal to install greater capacity.
This result reﬂects an additional limitation of this model since, although it may
be optimal to install very large capacity as  ↓ 1, nevertheless, the output price
is not aﬀected by such an investment decision as it is assumed to be exogenous.
All proofs can be found in the appendix.
Proposition 3.2.1 For all  > 1 the optimisation problem (3.13) has a solution,
while for  ↓ 1the solution diverges.
Although both the
g
MB and
g
MC curves shift downward with risk aversion, the
former decreases by more since it consists of the risky cash ﬂows. As a result,
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the marginal utility of the investment’s payoﬀ decreases, thereby motivating the
installation of smaller capacity. Finally, under risk aversion, increased volatility
decreases the
g
MB by decreasing the expected utility of risky cash ﬂows but leaves
the
g
MC unaﬀected since the cost is deterministic. Consequently, the marginal
utility of the investment’s payoﬀ decreases, thereby increasing the incentive to
install smaller capacity.
Proposition 3.2.2 For a now-or-never investment opportunity, the optimal ca-
pacity decreases with uncertainty under risk aversion.
If a ﬁrm were to install a capacity level, m˜
(0)
, such that m˜
(0)
< m˜
(0)
∗
, then the
expected utility of the investment’s payoﬀ will be reduced. As we will illustrate
numerically, the relative loss in project value due to ﬁxed capacity diminishes
with risk aversion and uncertainty for m˜
(0)
< m˜
(0)
∗
and increases for m˜
(0)
> m˜
(0)
∗
.
This implies that discretion over capacity becomes relatively less valuable as risk
aversion and uncertainty increase when the capacity installed is less than the
optimal and more valuable when the capacity installed is greater than the optimal.
Intuitively, risk aversion and uncertainty lower the expected utility of the project,
thereby diminishing the relative loss in the value of the project when the capacity
installed is suboptimal. By contrast, both of these attributes increase the ﬁrm’s
exposure to unfavourable market conditions when the capacity installed exceeds
the optimal level.
3.2.1.2 With a Deferral Option
Now, the ﬁrm has the option to defer investment, and the value of the investment
opportunity is deﬁned as follows:
F
(0)

1
(P
0
) ≡ sup

1
∈S
E
P
0
h
e
−
1
˜
F
(0)

P
(0)

1

i
(3.15)
where S denotes the collection of admissible stopping times of the ﬁltration gen-
erated by the price process. Notice that now investment is assumed to take place
at 
1
; therefore, the optimal capacity depends on the investment threshold price
at 
1
. Since the expected discount factor is E
P
0
[e
−
1
] =

P
0
P
(0)

1


1
(Karatzas and
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Shreve, 1999), the ﬁrm’s optimisation problem can be written as follows:
F
(0)

1
(P
0
) = max
P
(0)

1
≥P
0
 
P
0
P
(0)

1
!

1
⎡
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AU

m
(0)
∗
P
(0)

1

−
U

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(0)
∗
+ rbm
(0)
∗


⎤
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(3.16)
Notice that the optimisation problem described by (3.16) considers the inner
extremum over capacity choice. Solving this constrained optimisation problem,
we obtain the optimal investment threshold price as expressed by (3.17).
Proposition 3.2.3 For an irreversible investment opportunity, the optimal in-
vestment threshold is:
P
(0)
∗

1
=

c + rbm
(0)
∗−1



2
+  − 1

2

1
1−
(3.17)
An equivalent way of expressing (3.17) is by equating the marginal beneﬁt of
delaying investment (MB) to the marginal cost (MC):
 
P
0
P
(0)
∗

1
!

1
⎡
⎣
A
m
(0)
∗
1−
P
(0)
∗

1

+

1
P
(0)
∗

1
U

cm
(0)
∗
+ rbm
(0)
∗


⎤
⎦
=

1
A
P
(0)
∗

1
 
P
0
P
(0)
∗

1
!
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1
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
m
(0)
∗
P
(0)
∗

1
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(3.18)
As we will illustrate numerically, a marginal change in capacity impacts the left-
hand side of (3.18), which reﬂects the beneﬁt from allowing the project to start
at a higher output price and the beneﬁt from saving on investment and operating
cost from waiting longer, by more than the right-hand side, which reﬂects the
opportunity cost of forgone cash ﬂows. As a result, the marginal utility of the
investment’s payoﬀ when investment is delayed increases with greater capacity,
thereby increasing the incentive to postpone investment. According to Corollary
3.2.1, for a low output price, it is worthwhile to postpone investment as the MB
is greater than the MC.
Corollary 3.2.1 The MB curve is steeper than the MC curve at P
(0)
∗

1
.
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Notice that (3.17) describes the dependence of the optimal output price on the
optimal capacity. Since (3.14) yields the optimal capacity installed at the initial
output price, by setting P
0
= P
(0)
∗

1
in (3.14) and inserting the expression of P
(0)
∗

1
from (3.17), we can solve with respect to m
(0)
∗
and, thus, obtain the expression
of the optimal capacity. Finally, inserting the resulting expression for m
(0)
∗
into
(3.17), we obtain the optimal investment threshold, P
(0)
∗

1
. Unlike the case of
now-or-never investment, it is now possible to derive closed-form expressions for
both the optimal capacity and the optimal investment threshold price.
Proposition 3.2.4 For an irreversible investment opportunity, the optimal ca-
pacity is:
m
(0)
∗
=

c
rb
1− 
 (
1
+  − 1)− 
1

1
−1
,  >

1

1
+  − 1
(3.19)
According to (3.19), the cost function has to be strictly convex for the solutions to
the optimisation problems (3.13) and (3.15) to exist. Notice that with discretion
over capacity, risk aversion and volatility inﬂuence the optimal sizing and, in turn,
the investment timing decisions of the ﬁrm. Indeed, we can show that greater
risk aversion increases the incentive to install a project with smaller capacity in
order to reduce the long-run average cost of investment, i.e., c + rbm
(0)
−1
.
Proposition 3.2.5 The optimal capacity is decreasing in risk aversion.
While increased risk aversion creates an incentive to install a project with smaller
capacity, thereby resulting in a lower investment threshold, it simultaneously
creates an incentive to delay investment by lowering the expected utility of the
project. According to Proposition 3.2.6, the incentive to reduce the amount of
installed capacity in order to decrease the long-run average cost of investment is
more profound, thus resulting in the decrease of the optimal investment threshold.
Proposition 3.2.6 The optimal investment threshold price is decreasing in risk
aversion.
As (3.17) indicates, the optimal investment threshold price is equal to the prod-
uct of the long-run average cost of investment and a factor that represents the
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value of waiting to invest. This factor is greater than one, thereby implying that
the minimum output price triggering investment is strictly greater than the Mar-
shallian threshold, i.e., c + rbm
(0)
−1
. Since uncertainty increases the value of
waiting, the ﬁrm is more willing to postpone investment, and, as a result, the re-
quired investment threshold increases, thereby raising the corresponding optimal
capacity of the project and, in turn, the long-run average cost of investment.
Proposition 3.2.7 The optimal capacity is increasing in volatility.
Proposition 3.2.8 The optimal investment threshold price is increasing in volatil-
ity.
The greater the restrictions the ﬁrm faces regarding its ﬂexibility to adjust the
capacity of the project, the greater the loss in the value of the investment oppor-
tunity. Like in the now-or-never investment case, risk aversion lowers the optimal
capacity of the project, thereby diminishing the relative loss in option value when
the capacity installed is suboptimal. However, uncertainty has the opposite eﬀect
as it increases the investment threshold and the optimal capacity of the project.
Intuitively, as uncertainty increases the value of the option to invest, the loss
in option value increases with greater uncertainty when the capacity installed is
suboptimal and diminishes when the capacity level exceeds the optimal one.
3.2.2 Capacity Choice for an Investment Opportunity with
a Single Abandonment Option
3.2.2.1 Now-or-Never Investment
When an embedded option to abandon the project is available, the decision-
making problem the ﬁrm faces when exercising the investment opportunity im-
mediately is described by (3.20):
˜
F
(1)
(P
0
) = max
m˜
(1)

V
1

P
0
, m˜
(1)

+ F
(0)

2
(P
0
)

(3.20)
The last term, F
(0)

2
(P
0
), is the maximised value of the option to abandon an
active project, which is exercised when the output price is P
(0)

2
. Assuming that
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the optimal capacity installed at the investment stage is m˜
(1)
∗
, F
(0)

2
(P
0
) is deﬁned
as follows:
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(0)

2
(P
0
) = max
P
(0)

2
≤P
0
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0
P
(0)

2
!
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2
V
2
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
2
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∗

(3.21)
Note that the CRRA utility function is homogeneous of degree 1−  in m˜
(i)
, i.e.:
U

m˜
(i)
x

= m˜
(i)
1−
U(x) (3.22)
This implies that the solution to the optimisation problem described by (3.21),
i.e., the optimal abandonment threshold price, is independent of the optimal
capacity initially installed since, at abandonment, it equally impacts the ﬁrm’s
expected utility of both the revenues and the cost. Solving the unconstrained
optimisation problem, (3.21), yields the optimal abandonment threshold:
P
(0)
∗

2
= c


1
+  − 1

1

1
1−
(3.23)
In Chapter 2, it was shown that at each level of risk aversion, increased mar-
ket uncertainty delays abandonment by increasing its opportunity cost, while at
each level of volatility, risk aversion precipitates abandonment by decreasing the
expected utility of the project.
Finally, we address the optimisation problem described in (3.20) and deter-
mine the optimal capacity corresponding to the initial output price, i.e., m˜
(1)
∗
, for
the case of now-or-never investment. Like in Section 3.1, at the optimal capacity
level, the
g
MB of a unit increase in the project’s capacity has to be equal to the
g
MC, which yields (3.24):
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∗
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(3.24)
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Compared to (3.14), both the
g
MB and
g
MC have now increased due to the extra
terms on each side of (3.24), which are positive and represent the extra marginal
beneﬁt and marginal cost from the embedded abandonment option. Since at
abandonment, the expected utility of the salvageable operating cost is greater
than the expected utility of the forgone cash ﬂows, the
g
MB increases by more
than the
g
MC. Consequently, the abandonment option increases the marginal
utility of the investment’s payoﬀ, thereby creating an incentive to install a project
with greater capacity.
Proposition 3.2.9 With a single abandonment option, the optimal capacity of
the project is greater compared to an irreversible now-or-never investment oppor-
tunity, ceteris paribus.
Consequently, when investing immediately, an abandonment option increases the
relative loss in project value due to ﬁxed capacity when m˜
(1)
< m˜
(1)
∗
, thus in-
creasing the value of discretion over capacity, and decreases it when m˜
(1)
> m˜
(1)
∗
as it oﬀers downside protection.
3.2.2.2 With a Deferral Option
Now, the decision-making problem the ﬁrm faces is to maximise the value of the
investment opportunity subject to the constraint of optimal capacity choice at
investment:
F
(1)

1
(P
0
) ≡ max
P
(1)

1
≥P
0
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0
P
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!

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1
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∗

+ F
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
2

P
(1)

1

(3.25)
Compared to (3.16), the value of the investment opportunity has increased due to
the extra term on the right-hand side of (3.25), which is positive and represents
the value of the option to abandon the project. Solving the optimisation problem
described by (3.25), we obtain the non-linear equation (3.26), which yields the
optimal investment threshold price:
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Due to the extra term on the right-hand side of (3.26), which is negative, the
optimal investment threshold and, in turn, the corresponding capacity are now
lower relative to the case of investment without operational ﬂexibility, thereby im-
plying that the ability to hedge against the possibility of a downturn, through an
embedded abandonment option, increases the incentive to invest. Consequently,
relative to the case of irreversible investment, discretion over capacity is now
less valuable as the option to abandon the project narrows the wedge between
the optimal capacity level and the suboptimal capacity level the ﬁrm chooses.
Intuitively, the embedded option to abandon the project raises the value of the
option to invest, thus compensating for the loss in option value when the capacity
installed is lower than the optimal one.
3.2.3 Capacity Choice for an Investment Opportunity with
a Single Suspension and Resumption Option
3.2.3.1 Now-or-Never Investment
With a single suspension and resumption option, the ﬁrm’s problem when exer-
cising a now-or-never investment opportunity, is described by (3.27):
˜
F
(2)
(P
0
) = max
m˜
(2)

V
1

P
0
, m˜
(2)

+ F
(1)

2
(P
0
)

(3.27)
The last term, F
(1)

2
(P
0
), is the maximised value of the option to suspend an
active project with a subsequent resumption option, which is exercised when the
output price is P
(1)

2
. Assuming that the optimal capacity of the project is m˜
(2)
∗
,
F
(1)

2
(P
0
) is deﬁned as:
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Here, P
(1)

2
is the threshold price at which we suspend the investment project.
Analogously, we deﬁne F
(0)

3

P
(1)

2

to be the maximised value of the option to
resume forever a suspended project, and P
(0)

3
is the threshold price at which we
exercise the option to resume the investment project:
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Again, the homogeneity of the CRRA utility function implies that the optimal
resumption threshold is independent of the capacity of the project.
P
(0)
∗

3
= c


2
+  − 1

2

1
1−
(3.30)
Intuitively, this happens because at resumption the capacity initially installed
will impact equally the expected utility of the revenues and the cost. Since
h

2
+−1

2
i
1
1−
> 1, we have P
(0)
∗

3
> c, which implies that uncertainty and risk
aversion drive a wedge between the optimal resumption threshold and the oper-
ating cost. The size of this wedge depends on the levels of uncertainty and risk
aversion (Chapter 2).
Stepping back to when the investment project is active, we solve sub-problem
(3.28) and, thus, determine the critical threshold at which the suspension should
be exercised. Applying the FONC, we obtain the following non-linear equation
that gives the optimal suspension threshold:
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(3.31)
Notice that an embedded option to resume operations allows the ﬁrm to recover
the cash ﬂows it forgoes when exercising a suspension option and creates the in-
centive to suspend operations at a higher threshold by protecting the ﬁrm against
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a temporary downturn.
Now, we can determine the optimal capacity corresponding to the initial out-
put price by solving the optimisation problem described by (3.27), given P
(1)
∗

2
and P
(0)
∗

3
. The solution to this problem, m˜
(2)
∗
, is when the
g
MB of increasing
capacity is equal to the
g
MC, as illustrated by (3.32):
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Compared to (3.24), the
g
MB and
g
MC of increasing capacity have increased fur-
ther due to the extra terms on each side of (3.32) that are positive and represent
the extra
g
MB and
g
MC from the embedded resumption option. Since at resump-
tion the expected utility of revenues is greater than the expected utility of the
operating cost, the marginal utility of the investment’s payoﬀ increases further,
thereby motivating the installation of greater capacity.
3.2.3.2 With a Deferral Option
With the discretion to wait, the ﬁrm’s decision-making problem is described by
(3.33):
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The further increase in operational ﬂexibility increases the ﬁrm’s incentive to
invest in the project, thereby lowering the required investment threshold and
corresponding capacity. This is indicated by the last term on the right-hand side
of (3.34), which, compared to the case of investment with a single abandonment
option, is a greater negative number since it also consists of the embedded option
to resume operations:
73
3.2 Analytical Results
P
(2)
∗

1
=


2
+  − 1

2


c + rbm
(2)
∗−1

1−
+
(
2
− 
1
)(1− )

1
m
(2)
∗
1−
F
(1)

2

P
(2)

1


1
1−
(3.34)
Similar to the case of investment with abandonment, the subsequent option to re-
sume operations increases the value of the investment opportunity further. This,
in turn, compensates for the loss in option value when the ﬁrm chooses a subop-
timal capacity level, thereby making discretion over capacity less valuable.
3.2.4 Capacity Choice for an Investment Opportunity with
Complete Flexibility
3.2.4.1 Now-or-Never Investment
By investing immediately in a project with complete operational ﬂexibility, the
ﬁrm solves the following optimisation problem:
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The symmetry of the problem suggests that the optimal values of the output
prices at which each embedded option is exercised will not be aﬀected by ad-
ditional ﬂexibility. Thus, by P
(∞)

e
, where e stands for even (i.e., 2,4,6,...), we
denote the common threshold at which all suspension options are exercised, and
P
(∞)

o
, where o stands for odd (i.e., 3,5,7,...), the common threshold at which all
resumption options are exercised. F
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
o

P
(∞)

e
∗

is the option to resume a cur-
rently suspended project with inﬁnite resumption and suspension options, given
that the current value of the output price is P
(∞)

e
, and is given by (3.36):
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74
3.2 Analytical Results
where F
(∞)

e

P
(∞)

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
describes the project’s value in an active state.
Following the methodology of McDonald (2006), the value of an operating
project activated at P
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o
can be written as follows:
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Hence, the ﬁrm’s problem in an active state is:
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Substituting (3.39) into (3.36) and using as an initial guess for P
(∞)

e
the price
at which the option to abandon the investment project is exercised, i.e., P
(∞)

e
=
P
(0)
∗

2
, we obtain an equation that we maximise with respect to P
(∞)

o
. The estimate
of P
(∞)

o
we obtain this way is subsequently substituted into (3.39), which we
maximise with respect to P
(∞)

e
. This procedure is iterated until each solution
converges. Finally, we return to the optimisation problem described by (3.35) in
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order to obtain m˜
(∞)
∗
.
3.2.4.2 With a Deferral Option
Next, we account for the option to defer investment and solve the optimisation
problem (3.40), in order to obtain the optimal investment threshold, P
(∞)
∗

1
, and,
in turn, the optimal capacity, m
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Using the FONC, P
(∞)
∗

1
and m
(∞)
∗
are found numerically using the results for
P
(∞)
∗

o
, P
(∞)
∗

e
, and m˜
(∞)
∗
3.3 Numerical Results
3.3.1 Capacity Choice for an Irreversible Investment Op-
portunity
In order to illustrate the impact of risk aversion and uncertainty on the optimal
capacity, m
(0)
∗
, and optimal investment threshold, P
(0)
∗

1
, let  = 3, b = 5, r =  =
0.05,  ∈ [0, 0.2],  ∈ [0, 1) and  = 0.01. The initial output price is P
0
= $15,
while the operating cost is c = $13. Figure 3.5 illustrates the impact of risk
aversion and uncertainty on the marginal beneﬁt and marginal cost of increasing
capacity for an irreversible now-or-never investment opportunity. According to
the graph on the right, increased risk aversion decreases the
g
MB, which consists of
the risky cash ﬂows, more than the
g
MC and results in the decrease of the marginal
utility of the investment’s payoﬀ and the installation of smaller capacity. Notice
also that the cost of investment and, in turn, the
g
MC of increasing capacity,
is deterministic and, therefore, is not aﬀected by uncertainty both under risk
neutrality and risk aversion. On the other hand, the revenues are stochastic and,
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while uncertainty does not impact the
g
MB under risk neutrality, thereby leaving
the optimal capacity of the project unaﬀected, under risk aversion, the expected
utility of the revenues decreases. Hence, the
g
MB curve shifts downward with
volatility under risk aversion and intersects with the
g
MC curve at a lower level of
capacity, thus illustrating that, under risk aversion, increased volatility decreases
the optimal capacity of the project as shown in the graph on the right.
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Figure 3.5: Marginal beneﬁt and marginal cost of increasing capacity under risk
neutrality for  = 0.2 (left) and risk aversion, i.e.,  = 0.2 (right) for a now-or-
never investment opportunity
The impact of risk aversion and uncertainty on the optimal capacity is illus-
trated in Figure 3.6. Notice that while under risk neutrality the optimal capacity
of the project is unaﬀected by uncertainty, under risk aversion, the optimal ca-
pacity decreases. This happens because under risk aversion, uncertainty lowers
the expected utility of the investment’s payoﬀ, thereby creating an incentive to
reduce the amount of installed capacity.
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Figure 3.6: Optimal capacity versus risk aversion for an irreversible now-or-never
investment opportunity
As Figure 3.7 illustrates, the relative loss in the value of the now-or-never
investment opportunity due to ﬁxed capacity, i.e.,
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diminishes for m˜
(0)
< m˜
(0)
∗
, becomes zero for m˜
(0)
= m˜
(0)
∗
, and then increases
for m˜
(0)
> m˜
(0)
∗
. This happens because an increase in the amount of installed
capacity raises the expected utility of the investment payoﬀ, and, as a result, the
discrepancy between the maximised value of the now-or-never investment oppor-
tunity, V
1

P
0
, m˜
(0)
∗

, and the expected utility of the static NPV, V
1

P
0
, m˜
(0)

,
diminishes as m˜
(0)
increases and approaches m˜
(0)
∗
, becomes zero for m˜
(0)
= m˜
(0)
∗
,
and then increases for m˜
(0)
> m˜
(0)
∗
. Notice also that V
1

P
0
, m˜
(0)
∗

becomes neg-
ative for large values of m
(0)
, since then the expected utility of the cost is larger
than that of the revenues. As a result, the relative loss in project value be-
comes greater than 1. As the left panel illustrates, for m˜
(0)
< m˜
(0)
∗
the relative
loss in the value of the now-or-never investment opportunity decreases with in-
creasing risk aversion. This happens because if a ﬁrm picks some capacity level
m˜
(0)
< m˜
(0)
∗
, then increased risk aversion reduces V
1

P
0
, m˜
(0)

. By contrast,
with discretion over capacity, greater risk aversion lowers m
(0)
∗
as well, thereby
reducing V
1

P
0
, m˜
(0)
∗

further. Consequently, for m˜
(0)
< m˜
(0)
∗
, with increasing
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risk aversion, the expected utility of the now-or-never investment opportunity
decreases by more than that of the static NPV, thereby reducing the discrepancy
between V
1

P
0
, m˜
(0)

and V
1

P
0
, m˜
(0)
∗

. For m˜
(0)
> m˜
(0)
∗
, we observe the op-
posite eﬀect since, due to the decrease of optimal capacity with increasing risk
aversion, the wedge between m˜
(0)
and m˜
(0)
∗
increases. Notice that uncertainty
has the same impact on the optimal capacity as risk aversion, and, as a result, the
relative loss in the value of the now-or-never investment opportunity diminishes
with increasing uncertainty for m˜
(0)
< m˜
(0)
∗
and increases for m˜
(0)
> m˜
(0)
∗
as in
the right panel.
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Figure 3.7: Relative loss in project value due to ﬁxed capacity versus  for  = 0.2
(left) and versus  for  = 0.2 (right)
Interestingly, when allowing for the option to delay investment, we observe
that increased risk aversion lowers the value of the investment opportunity, thereby
increasing the required investment threshold while, at the same time, creating an
incentive to install a project with smaller capacity in order to reduce the incurred
investment cost. In Figure 3.8, the graph on the left shows that the optimal ca-
pacity decreases with risk aversion, thereby implying that the incentive to invest
at a lower threshold in order to incur a lower sunk and operating cost is more pro-
found than the incentive to delay investment. By contrast, uncertainty increases
the investment threshold by increasing its opportunity cost, thereby increasing
the optimal capacity. As the graph on the right indicates, the optimal investment
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threshold price decreases with risk aversion since a lower output price is required
to install smaller capacity. On the other hand, uncertainty increases the oppor-
tunity cost of investment and, in turn, the required investment threshold price.
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Figure 3.8: Optimal capacity and optimal investment threshold versus risk aver-
sion and uncertainty
In Figure 3.9, the left panel illustrates how risk aversion impacts the marginal
beneﬁt and marginal cost of delaying investment. By delaying investment, the
ﬁrm suﬀers from forgoing cash ﬂows; however, it beneﬁts from not only allowing
the project to start at a higher output price but also saving on sunk and operating
cost. According to the left panel, risk aversion decreases the marginal beneﬁt and
marginal cost of delaying investment. Since the latter consists exclusively of the
risky cash ﬂow it should get aﬀected more, thereby resulting in the increase of the
marginal utility of the investment’s payoﬀ as well as the increase of the optimal
investment threshold. However, with discretion over capacity, the subsequent
decrease in the amount of installed capacity due to increased risk aversion causes
the MB to decrease by more than the MC. This lowers the expected utility
of the investment’s payoﬀ and, in turn, the amount of installed capacity. On
the other hand, uncertainty increases the investment threshold and increases the
amount of installed capacity. As a result, the marginal beneﬁt increases by more
than the marginal cost, thereby resulting in the increase of the marginal utility
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of the investment’s payoﬀ and the subsequent increase of the required investment
threshold.
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Figure 3.9: Marginal beneﬁt and marginal cost of delaying investment versus 
for  = 0.2 (left) and versus  for  = 0.2
The impact of volatility and risk aversion on the value of the investment op-
portunity, F
(0)

1
(P
0
), and the value of the project, V
1

P
t
, m
(0)

, is illustrated in
Figure 3.10. The value of the investment opportunity, evaluated at the initial out-
put price, P
0
, increases with uncertainty, thereby raising the required investment
threshold, as in the graph on the left. As a result, the optimal capacity increases,
thus causing the expected utility of the project to increase more rapidly. By con-
trast, the graph on the right shows that the value of the investment opportunity
decreases with risk aversion. At the same time, risk aversion increases the incen-
tive to install a project with smaller capacity in order to incur lower investment
cost, thereby causing the project value to increase more slowly.
81
3.3 Numerical Results
0 10 20 30 40 50
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
Output Price, P
t
O
p
t
i
o
n
V
a
l
u
e
,
P
r
o
j
e
c
t
V
a
l
u
e
(
u
t
i
l
s
)
Investment Opportunity Value
w/o Flexibility
Project Value w/o Flexibility
Optimal Investment Threshold
σ = 0.1
σ = 0.15
σ = 0.2
0 10 20 30 40 50
−1000
−500
0
500
1000
1500
Output Price, P
t
O
p
t
i
o
n
V
a
l
u
e
,
P
r
o
j
e
c
t
V
a
l
u
e
(
u
t
i
l
s
)
γ = 0.2
γ = 0.4
γ = 0.6
Investment Opportunity Value
w/o Flexibility
Project Value w/o Flexibility
Optimal Investment Threshold
Figure 3.10: Option and project value versus  for  = 0.2 (left) and versus  for
 = 0.2 (right)
Figure 3.11 illustrates how risk aversion and uncertainty impact the relative
loss in option value, i.e.,
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(3.42)
due to ﬁxed capacity. Like in the now-or-never investment case, increased risk
aversion reduces the amount of installed capacity and, as a result, with greater
risk aversion the relative loss in option value diminishes for m
(0)
< m
(0)
∗
and
increases for m
(0)
> m
(0)
∗
. By contrast, uncertainty now delays investment,
thereby increasing the required investment threshold and the corresponding op-
timal capacity. Consequently, as the graph on the right illustrates, the relative
loss in option value increases with uncertainty for m
(0)
< m
(0)
∗
and diminishes
for m
(0)
> m
(0)
∗
. Hence, discretion over capacity becomes relatively less valuable
with increasing risk aversion and more valuable with increasing uncertainty when
m
(0)
< m
(0)
∗
, while the opposite is observed for m
(0)
> m
(0)
∗
.
82
3.3 Numerical Results
0 1 2 3 4 5
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Capacity (units/annum)
R
e
l
a
t
i
v
e
L
o
s
s
i
n
O
p
t
i
o
n
V
a
l
u
e
γ = 0.2
γ = 0.4
γ = 0.6
0 1 2 3 4 5
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Capacity (units/annum)
R
e
l
a
t
i
v
e
L
o
s
s
i
n
O
p
t
i
o
n
V
a
l
u
e
σ = 0.2
σ = 0.1
σ = 0.15
Figure 3.11: Relative loss in option value due to ﬁxed capacity versus  for  = 0.2
(left) and versus  for  = 0.2 (right)
3.3.2 Capacity Choice for an Investment Opportunity with
a Single Abandonment Option
For the same parameter values as in Section 3.3.1 and assuming that investment
takes place immediately, we observe that the marginal utility of the investment’s
payoﬀ increases when the ﬁrm has the additional option to abandon the project,
as Figure 3.12 illustrates. This happens because, at abandonment, the expected
utility of the salvageable operating cost is greater than the expected utility of
the forgone cash ﬂows, and, as a result, the marginal beneﬁt of increasing capac-
ity increases by more than the marginal cost. Consequently, the
g
MB and
g
MC
curves intersect at a higher capacity level compared to the case of irreversible
investment. Notice that under risk neutrality, uncertainty impacts only the extra
marginal beneﬁt and extra marginal cost of increasing capacity from the embed-
ded abandonment option and, since c > P
(0)
∗

2
, the
g
MB increases by more than
the
g
MC, thereby resulting in higher installed capacity. Under risk aversion, we
observe that the increase in capacity is less profound than under risk neutrality
because now uncertainty decreases also the expected utility of the risk cash ﬂows,
thereby creating an opposing eﬀect that does not allow the
g
MB to increase as
much as under risk neutrality.
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Figure 3.12:
g
MB and
g
MC of increasing capacity under risk neutrality (left) and
risk aversion, i.e.,  = 0.2 (right), for a now-or-never investment opportunity with
an embedded abandonment option
Unlike the case of irreversible investment, the optimal capacity of the project
increases with uncertainty under low risk aversion and decreases with uncertainty
under high risk aversion, as in Figure 3.13. Notice that under risk neutrality, un-
certainty increases the value of the embedded abandonment option without aﬀect-
ing the value of the active project. Thus, the expected utility of the investment’s
payoﬀ and, in turn, the incentive to install greater capacity increases. By con-
trast, under risk aversion, uncertainty lowers the value of the active project and
this eﬀect becomes more profound and dominates for high levels of risk aversion.
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Figure 3.13: Optimal capacity versus risk aversion for a now-or-never investment
opportunity with an abandonment option
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According to Figure 3.14, the relative loss in project value due to ﬁxed capacity
has increased for m˜
(1)
< m˜
(1)
∗
and m˜
(0)
< m˜
(0)
∗
, since now the ﬁrm misses
the optimal capacity by more than in the case of irreversible investment, and
decreased for m˜
(1)
> m˜
(1)
∗
and m˜
(0)
> m˜
(0)
∗
, since the abandonment option
provides downside protection. This implies that, with an abandonment option,
discretion over capacity becomes more valuable relative to the case of irreversible
investment when, in both cases, the amount of installed capacity is less than the
optimal one and less valuable when it is greater. Like in Section 3.3.1, risk aversion
diminishes the relative loss in project value for m˜
(1)
< m˜
(1)
∗
and increases it for
m˜
(1)
> m˜
(1)
∗
as it increases the incentive to install less capacity. By contrast,
uncertainty increases the optimal capacity of the project by increasing the value of
the embedded abandonment option. Thus, the relative loss in project value, which
equals 1 for m˜
(1)
= 0, increases for m˜
(1)
< m˜
(1)
∗
and decreases for m˜
(1)
> m˜
(1)
∗
.
However, the impact of uncertainty under risk aversion is less profound compared
to the risk neutrality case due to the simultaneous decrease of the expected utility
of the active project.
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Figure 3.14: Relative loss in project value due to ﬁxed capacity versus  for
 = 0.2 (left) and versus  for  = 0.2 (right)
An embedded option to abandon an active project in case the output price
drops increases the value of the investment opportunity and decreases the re-
quired investment threshold. Figure 3.15 shows the impact of the embedded
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abandonment option on the value of the project and the value of the option to
invest, as well as the relative increase in option value evaluated at P
0
due to
the embedded abandonment option. In the graph on the left, for  = 0.2 and
 = 0.2, we observe that the embedded abandonment option increases the value
of the investment opportunity as well as the value of the active project, thereby
increasing the ﬁrm’s incentive to invest in the project. The graph on right shows
that the relative increase in option value due to the embedded abandonment op-
tion is more signiﬁcant for higher levels of uncertainty and risk aversion. This
implies that as risk aversion and uncertainty increase, the option to abandon an
active project becomes more valuable.
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Figure 3.15: Impact of abandonment option on the option to invest and the value
of the project
Like in Section 3.3.1, both the optimal investment threshold and the opti-
mal capacity decrease with risk aversion and increase with volatility, as in Figure
3.16. The graph on the left indicates that the optimal investment threshold has
decreased compared to the case of irreversible investment because the embedded
abandonment option increases the value of the investment opportunity, thereby
increasing the incentive to invest. Although at a common investment threshold,
an embedded abandonment option increases the project’s optimal capacity, allow-
ing for the option to delay investment, increased operational ﬂexibility facilitates
investment, thus leading to the installation of a project with smaller capacity, as
the graph on the right indicates.
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Figure 3.16: Optimal investment threshold and optimal capacity versus risk aver-
sion and uncertainty
According to (3.17), since the embedded abandonment option facilitates in-
vestment, thereby lowering the required investment threshold and the corre-
sponding optimal capacity, discretion over capacity becomes less valuable when
m
(1)
< m
(1)
∗
and more valuable when m
(1)
> m
(1)
∗
, as illustrated in Figure
3.17. Like in Section 3.3.1, increased risk aversion reduces the optimal capacity
of the project and, as a result, the relative loss in option value diminishes for
m
(1)
< m
(1)
∗
and increases for m
(1)
> m
(1)
∗
. On the other hand uncertainty
has the opposite eﬀect as it delays investment thereby increasing the required
investment threshold and the corresponding optimal capacity.
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Figure 3.17: Relative loss in option value due to ﬁxed capacity versus  for  = 0.2
(left) and versus  for  = 0.2 (right)
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3.3.3 Capacity Choice for an Investment Opportunity with
a Single Suspension and Resumption Option
In Figure 3.18, we illustrate the impact of the additional resumption option on
the
g
MB and
g
MC of increasing capacity for the now-or-never investment case.
Since, at resumption, the expected utility of the revenues is greater than that of
the operating cost, the impact of the embedded resumption option on the
g
MB
of increasing capacity is more profound. As a result, the embedded resumption
option increases the marginal utility of the investment payoﬀ and, in turn, the
optimal capacity.
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Figure 3.18:
g
MB and
g
MC of increasing capacity under risk neutrality (left) and
risk aversion, i.e.,  = 0.2 (right), for a now-or-never investment opportunity with
a single suspension and resumption option
Similar to the case of investment with abandonment, the optimal capacity of
the project increases with uncertainty under low risk aversion and decreases under
high risk aversion as in Figure 3.19. However, we observe now that uncertainty
increases the optimal capacity for a larger range of values of the risk aversion
parameter. This happens because as operational ﬂexibility increases, the impact
of uncertainty on the embedded options becomes more profound than on the
value of the active project.
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Figure 3.19: Optimal capacity versus risk aversion for a now-or-never investment
opportunity with a single suspension and resumption option
As a resumption option increases the optimal capacity of the project further,
relative to the case of investment with abandonment, discretion over capacity
is now more valuable when, in both cases, the amount of installed capacity is
lower than the optimal one and relatively less valuable when it is greater. Like
in Section 3.3.2, increased risk aversion lowers the amount of installed capacity,
and, as a result, the relative loss in project value diminishes for m˜
(2)
< m˜
(2)
∗
and
increases for m˜
(2)
> m˜
(2)
∗
. On the other hand, uncertainty has the opposite eﬀect
as it raises the optimal capacity and, as a result, the relative loss in project value
increases for m˜
(2)
< m˜
(2)
∗
and diminishes for m˜
(2)
> m˜
(2)
∗
.
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Figure 3.20: Relative loss in project value due to ﬁxed capacity versus  for
 = 0.2 (left) and versus  for  = 0.2 (right)
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An embedded option to resume a currently suspended project increases the
value of the option to invest as well as the value of the active project further.
Greater operational ﬂexibility increases the ﬁrm’s incentive to invest, thereby
lowering the required investment threshold further. This is illustrated in Figure
3.21, where the graph on the left indicates the further increase of the value of the
investment opportunity as well as the further decrease of the optimal investment
threshold for  = 0.2 and  = 0.2. The graph on the right shows that the impact
of the embedded resumption option on the value of the option to invest is more
profound for higher levels of uncertainty and risk aversion.
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Figure 3.21: Impact of resumption option on the project value and the value of
the option to invest
As Figure 3.22 indicates, relative to the case of investment with abandonment,
discretion over capacity becomes less valuable for m
(2)
< m
(2)
∗
and m
(1)
< m
(1)
∗
,
and more valuable for m
(2)
> m
(2)
∗
and m
(1)
> m
(1)
∗
, as the option to resume
operations lowers the required investment threshold and the corresponding opti-
mal capacity further. Again, risk aversion diminishes the relative loss in option
value for m
(2)
< m
(2)
∗
and increases it for m
(2)
> m
(2)
∗
by reducing the optimal
capacity, while increasing uncertainty has the opposite eﬀect by increasing the
optimal capacity.
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Figure 3.22: Relative loss in option due to ﬁxed capacity value versus  for  = 0.2
(left) and versus  for  = 0.2 (right)
Like the case of investment with a single abandonment option, an embed-
ded resumption option increases the value of the investment opportunity further,
thereby increasing the ﬁrm’s incentive to invest. As a result, the optimal in-
vestment threshold and the corresponding optimal capacity decrease further, as
illustrated in Figure 3.23. Again, with discretion over capacity, risk aversion cre-
ates an incentive to reduce the cost of investment, thereby resulting in a reduced
optimal capacity as well as a lower optimal investment threshold.
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Figure 3.23: Optimal investment threshold and optimal capacity versus risk aver-
sion and uncertainty
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3.3.4 Capacity Choice under Complete Operational Flex-
ibility
With complete operational ﬂexibility, the expected utility of the investment’s
payoﬀ increases further, thereby increasing the incentive to install more capacity
when investing immediately, as shown in Figure 3.24. This, in turn, increases the
value of discretion over capacity, relative to the cases of investment with ﬁnite
ﬂexibility, for m˜
(∞)
< m˜
(∞)
∗
and m˜
(2)
< m˜
(2)
∗
and decreases it for m˜
(∞)
> m˜
(∞)
∗
and m˜
(2)
> m˜
(2)
∗
. Again, like in Sections 3.3.2 and 3.3.3, risk aversion reduces
the relative loss in project value for m˜
(∞)
< m˜
(∞)
∗
by lowering the amount of
installed capacity, while uncertainty has the opposite eﬀect by increasing the
optimal capacity of the project.
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Figure 3.24: Relative loss in project value due to ﬁxed capacity versus  for
 = 0.2 (left) and versus  for  = 0.2 (right)
Inﬁnite suspension and resumption options increase the value of the invest-
ment opportunity further creating an even greater incentive to invest. As Figure
3.25 illustrates, under complete operational ﬂexibility the value of the option
to invest and the value of the active project is greater compared to the case of
investment with a single suspension and resumption option. Consequently, the
increased incentive to invest leads to a further decrease of the optimal investment
threshold.
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Figure 3.25: Option value and project value versus P
t
under complete operational
ﬂexibility
Similar to Sections 3.3.2 and 3.3.3, the relative loss in option value due to
ﬁxed capacity increases further when the capacity installed is lower than the
optimal and diminishes when it is greater as shown in Figure 3.26. The impact
of risk aversion and uncertainty is the same as in Sections 3.3.2 and 3.3.3 since
the former reduces the optimal capacity by decreasing the expected utility of the
project and the latter increases it by delaying investment.
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Figure 3.26: Relative loss in option value due to ﬁxed capacity versus  for  = 0.2
(left) and versus  for  = 0.2 (right)
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Like in Sections 3.3.2 and 3.3.3, by increasing the level of ﬂexibility the value
of the investment opportunity increases, thereby motivating the ﬁrm to require
a lower investment threshold. This, in turn, leads to the further decrease of the
project’s optimal capacity as Figure 3.27 illustrates.
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Figure 3.27: Optimal investment threshold and optimal capacity versus risk aver-
sion, under complete operational ﬂexibility
3.4 Conclusions
In a world of increasing economic uncertainty, the need to examine the interac-
tion between risk aversion and operational ﬂexibility, so as to provide optimal
investment, operational, and sizing decisions, is of great essence. The main con-
tribution of this chapter is that it illustrates how risk aversion can impact the
optimal investment strategy in a very diﬀerent way than what the traditional
literature has so far indicated. We show that risk aversion facilitates investment
(unlike the case with ﬁxed capacity) and reduces the optimal capacity of the
project. Furthermore, uncertainty now aﬀects the now-or-never optimal capac-
ity in a non-monotonic manner that is not captured by Dangl (1999). We also
ﬁnd that, with the option to delay investment, discretion over capacity becomes
more important with increasing uncertainty and less important with higher risk
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aversion when the level of capacity installed is lower than the optimal one. When
investing immediately in a project without operational ﬂexibility, discretion over
capacity is more important with increasing risk aversion and uncertainty, however,
with operational ﬂexibility, the impact of uncertainty on the value of discretion
over capacity is ambiguous. Finally, we illustrate how operational ﬂexibility in-
creases the value of the investment opportunity and, in turn, the incentive to
invest, thereby resulting in the decrease of the optimal capacity.
So far, we have examined how the optimal investment, operational, and sizing
decisions of a single ﬁrm are aﬀected by risk aversion, uncertainty, and operational
ﬂexibility without taking into account the presence of other ﬁrms that may want
to enter the market. This is the objective of Chapter 4, where we analyse how
duopolistic competition impacts the entry decision of ﬁrms in pre-emptive and
non-pre-emptive duopoly settings.
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Chapter 4
Duopolistic Competition under
Risk Aversion and Uncertainty
Due to the deregulation of many sectors of the economy, decision rules for man-
aging capital projects should consider not only uncertainty in the underlying
variables but also competition in the output market. For example, in Europe,
ever since the euro was introduced, there has been an increase in competition in
sectors such as transport, energy, and telecommunications, which only a decade
ago were the preserve of state monopolies. Furthermore, the ongoing process
of mergers and takeovers as well as legislation against monopolies justiﬁes the
existence of and development toward more competitive markets. Indicative of
this situation is the new partnership between Nokia and Microsoft. This alliance
was the result of tough competition due to which Nokia lost its leadership in the
area of smartphone operating system shipments to Android (and, in turn, mar-
ket share to rivals such as Google and Apple) and risk aversion due to costs of
ﬁnancial distress (The Wall Street Journal, 2011). Another example is from the
energy sector where the natural gas industry is undergoing signiﬁcant changes as
European legislation regarding competition is forcing gas companies to restruc-
ture their business and make room for new entrants, thus leading to increased
competition (Independent Energy Review, 2010).
Canonical real options theory ﬁnds particular application in such sectors as it
facilitates the analysis of capital budgeting decisions by accounting for the ﬂexi-
bility embedded in them. However, treatment of such decision-making problems
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via canonical real options theory has mainly been under monopoly or perfect com-
petition. Moreover, recent work that considers a duopolistic setting has assumed
risk neutrality. In this chapter, we extend the traditional real options approach to
strategic decision making under uncertainty by examining how duopolistic com-
petition aﬀects the entry of a risk-averse ﬁrm. We consider two identical ﬁrms
that are risk averse and hold an option each to invest in a project that yields
stochastic revenues. The ﬁrms face the same output market, and, as a result,
investment decisions of one ﬁrm impact the revenues of both ﬁrms. We begin
by analysing the monopolistic case and then extend this framework by adding
one more ﬁrm assuming either a pre-emptive or a non-pre-emptive setting. In
the pre-emptive duopoly, both ﬁrms have the incentive to invest in order to ob-
tain the leader’s advantage, while in the non-pre-emptive duopoly, the role of the
leader is assigned exogenously. For each setting, we analyse the impact of uncer-
tainty and risk aversion on the optimal investment timing decisions of the two
competing ﬁrms and examine the degree to which the presence of a competitor
impacts the entry of a risk-averse ﬁrm. Hence, the contribution of this chapter
is threefold. First, we develop a theoretical framework for analysing investment
under uncertainty and risk aversion for a monopoly as well as pre-emptive and
non-pre-emptive duopolies in order to derive closed-form expressions where pos-
sible for the optimal investment thresholds. Second, we quantify the degree to
which competition impacts the strategic investment decisions of a risk-averse ri-
val. Finally, we provide managerial insights for investment decisions and relative
ﬁrm values under each setting based on analytical and numerical results.
We proceed by formulating the problems in Section 4.1. In Section 4.2, we
solve the problems and analyse the impact of uncertainty and risk aversion on the
optimal investment timing decisions of the two competing ﬁrms in each setting. In
Section 4.3, we provide numerical examples for each case in order to examine the
eﬀects of volatility and risk aversion on the optimal investment timing decisions
and quantify the degree to which the entry of the risk-averse ﬁrm is aﬀected by the
presence of a rival. We also illustrate the interaction between risk aversion and
uncertainty and present managerial insights to enable more informed investment
decisions. Section 4.4 concludes by summarising the results and oﬀering directions
for future research.
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4.1 Problem Formulation
4.1.1 Assumptions and Notation
Assume that each ﬁrm i, i = 1, 2, can incur an investment cost, K, in order
to start a project that produces output forever with no operating cost. Time is
continuous and denoted by t, and the revenue received from the project at time
t ≥ 0 is R
t
= P
t
D(Q
t
) ($/annum). Here, Q
t
denotes the number of ﬁrms in the
industry, i.e., Q
t
= 0, 1, 2, and D(Q
t
) is a strictly decreasing function reﬂecting
the quantity demanded from each ﬁrm per annum. We assume that the price per
unit of the project’s output, P
t
, follows a GBM:
dP
t
= P
t
dt + P
t
dZ
t
, P
0
> 0 (4.1)
where  ≥ 0 is the growth rate of P
t
,  ≥ 0 is the volatility of P
t
, and dZ
t
is
the increment of the standard Brownian motion. Also, we denote by r ≥ 0 the
risk-free discount rate and by  ≥  the subjective discount rate. Let 
j
i
be the
time at which ﬁrm j, j = ℓ, f (denoting leader or follower, respectively), enters
the industry given market structure i = m, p, n (denoting monopoly, pre-emptive
duopoly, or non-pre-emptive duopoly, respectively), i.e.,

j
i
≡ min
n
t ≥ 0 : P
t
≥ P

j
i
o
(4.2)
where P

j
i
is the corresponding output price. Finally, we denote by F

j
i
(P
0
) the
expected value of ﬁrm j’s investment opportunity under market structure i that
is exercised at time 
j
i
and by V
j
i
(P
0
) the expected NPV of ﬁrm j given the initial
output price, P
0
.
In order to account for risk aversion, we assume that the preferences of both
ﬁrms are described by an identical increasing and concave utility function, U(⋅).
As a result, our analysis can accommodate a wide range of utility functions, such
as HARA, CARA, and CRRA utility functions. In our analysis, we apply a
CRRA utility function as in Hugonnier and Morellec (2007) deﬁned as follows:
U(P
t
) =
(
P
1−
t
1−
if  ≥ 0 &  ∕= 1
ln(P
t
) if  = 1
(4.3)
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4.1.2 Monopoly
We begin by formulating the problem for the case of monopoly, where a single
ﬁrm starts a perpetually operating project at a random time 
j
m
. Up to time 
j
m
,
the monopolist invests K in a risk-free bond and earns an instantaneous cash
ﬂow of rK per time unit with utility U (rK) discounted at her subjective rate
of time preference,  > . At 
j
m
, when the output price is P

j
m
, the monopolist
swaps this risk-free cash ﬂow for a risky one, P
t
D(1), with utility U (P
t
D(1)) as
illustrated in Figure 4.1.
P
0
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R

j
m
0
e
−t
U (rK) dt
-
R
∞
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j
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e
−t
U (P
t
D(1)) dt
-
P

j
m
-

j
m
∙
0
∙
t
Figure 4.1: Investment under risk aversion for a monopoly
The conditional expected utility of the cash ﬂows discounted to time t = 0 is:
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where,
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(4.5)
is the expected utility of the project’s cash ﬂows discounted to 
j
m
, and the mo-
nopolist’s objective is to maximise the discounted expected utility of the project’s
cash ﬂows, i.e., E
P
0
h
e
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j
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i
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
. Here, E
P
0
denotes the expectation opera-
tor, which is conditional on the initial value of the price process.
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4.1.3 Duopoly
4.1.3.1 Pre-Emptive Duopoly
We extend the previous framework by adding one more ﬁrm to the industry. Since
here the roles of the leader and the follower are deﬁned endogenously, the two
ﬁrms are ﬁghting for the leader’s position, and, therefore, each one of them runs
the risk of pre-emption. The ﬁrm that enters the market ﬁrst is the leader, and
the ﬁrm that enters second is the follower as shown in Figure 4.2.
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Figure 4.2: Investment under risk aversion for a pre-emptive duopoly
Consequently, the conditional expected utility of all future cash ﬂows of the
follower discounted to t = 
ℓ
p
is:
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where,
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is the expected utility of the project’s cash ﬂows discounted to 
f
p
, and, like the
monopoly case, the scope of the pre-emptive follower is to maximise the dis-
counted to 
ℓ
p
expected utility of the project’s cash ﬂows, i.e., E
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p
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i
×
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Next, the conditional expected utility of all future cash ﬂows of the leader
discounted to t = 
ℓ
p
is:
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Notice that up to time 
f
p
, the leader enjoys monopolistic proﬁts as in (2.4), while
after the entry of the follower the two ﬁrms share the market, as illustrated in
Figure 4.2. This implies that, although up to time 
f
p
the leader is alone in the
market, her value function does not correspond to that of a monopolist since the
future entry of the follower reduces the expected utility of the leader’s proﬁts.
This reduction is reﬂected by the second term on the right-hand side of (4.8),
which is negative since D(2) < D(1).
4.1.3.2 Non-Pre-Emptive Duopoly
Here, the roles of the leader and the follower are deﬁned exogenously. Conse-
quently, the future cash ﬂows of the leader are discounted to time t = 0. Since
the follower considers entry into the market assuming that the leader has already
invested, the future cash ﬂows of the follower are discounted to 
ℓ
n
as illustrated
in Figure 4.3. The conditional expected utility of the follower’s cash ﬂows is the
same as in the pre-emptive case but discounted to 
ℓ
n
, i.e.,
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where V
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(⋅) = V
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(⋅) and the objective of the follower is to maximise the expres-
sion E
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Figure 4.3: Investment under risk aversion for a non-pre-emptive duopoly
The leader now knows that she has the right to enter the market ﬁrst and,
therefore, does not run the risk of pre-emption. As a result, the expected utility
of the leader’s future cash ﬂows discounted to t = 0 is:
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where V
ℓ
p
(⋅) is deﬁned as in (4.8). Here, the objective of the leader is to maximise
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4.2 Analytical Results
4.2.1 Monopoly
In this case, there is a single ﬁrm in the market that contemplates investment
without the fear of pre-emption from the entry of a competitor. Consequently,
the ﬁrm has the option to delay investment until the output price hits the op-
timal threshold, P

j
∗
m
, that will trigger investment. Hence, for P
0
≤ P

j
∗
m
, (4.11)
indicates the value of the monopolist’s investment opportunity:
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Here, S denotes the collection of admissible stopping times of the ﬁltration gen-
erated by the price process. Using Theorem 9.18 of Karatzas and Shreve (1999)
for the CRRA utility function in (4.3), we ﬁnd that the expression in (4.5) can
be simpliﬁed using the following:
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the following quadratic equation:
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By using the fact that the expected discount factor is E
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(Karatzas and Shreve, 1999) and applying the strong Markov property along with
the law of iterated expectations, (4.11) can be written as follows:
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Solving the unconstrained optimisation problem (4.14), we obtain the optimal
investment threshold, P

j
∗
m
, for the monopolist:
P
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rK
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
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2

1
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(4.15)
According to (4.15), uncertainty and risk aversion drive a wedge between the
optimal investment threshold and the amortised investment cost. Indeed, it can
be shown that higher risk aversion increases the required investment threshold
by decreasing the expected utility of the investment’s payoﬀ, while increased
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uncertainty delays investment by increasing the value of waiting. All proofs can
be found in the appendix.
Proposition 4.2.1 Uncertainty and risk aversion increase the optimal invest-
ment threshold.
4.2.2 Symmetric Pre-Emptive Duopoly
We solve this dynamic game backward by ﬁrst assuming that the leader has just
entered the market. The value of the follower at 
ℓ
p
< 
f
p
is indicated in (4.16):
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Solving the unconstrained optimisation problem described by (4.16), we obtain
the optimal threshold, P

f
∗
p
, that triggers the entry of the follower:
P
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Notice that since D(2) < D(1), we have P

f
∗
p
> P

j
∗
m
, i.e., the optimal entry
threshold of the pre-emptive follower is higher than that of the monopolist. In-
tuitively, this happens because the follower requires compensation for losing the
ﬁrst-mover advantage. After the critical threshold, P

f
∗
p
, is hit, the value of the
follower is the discounted expected utility of the project’s cash ﬂows, as indicated
by (4.7).
Assuming that the follower chooses the optimal policy, the value function of
the leader for P

ℓ
p
≤ P
t
< P

f
∗
p
, i.e., when the leader is alone in the market, is:
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For P
t
≥ P

f
∗
p
, the two ﬁrms share the market and, as a result, the value function
of the leader is the same as the follower’s.
As we show in Proposition 4.2.2, under a large discrepancy in market share,
there exists a ﬁnite output price at which the pre-emptive leader’s value function
is maximised. Otherwise, the pre-emptive leader’s value function is strictly in-
creasing. Intuitively, a higher output price simultaneously increases the expected
discounted utility of cash ﬂows and facilitates the follower’s entry. With a higher
loss in market share, the impact of the latter eﬀect dominates.
Proposition 4.2.2 The value function of the pre-emptive leader is concave, and
its maximum value is obtained prior to the entry of the pre-emptive follower
provided that:
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In order to determine the leader’s optimal investment threshold, we need to
consider the strategic interactions between the leader and the follower. Let P

ℓ
∗
p
denote the threshold price at which a ﬁrm is indiﬀerent between becoming a leader
or a follower. Recall that in the pre-emptive setting both ﬁrms want to enter ﬁrst
in order to obtain the leader’s advantage. However, for P
t
< P

ℓ
∗
p
, the follower has
not entered the market, and a ﬁrm would be better oﬀ being the follower since
then V
ℓ
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t
) < F

f
p
(P
t
), while for P
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, a ﬁrm is better oﬀ being a leader since
then V
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). Hence, it must be the case that V
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for entry, a condition that is found numerically by solving the following equation:
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Solving (4.20) for P

ℓ
∗
p
, we obtain the entry threshold of the leader that denotes
the output price at which a ﬁrm is indiﬀerent between becoming a leader or a
follower. Indeed, as we show in Proposition 4.2.3, the optimal entry threshold
of the pre-emptive leader is lower than that of the monopolist. This happens
because the risk of pre-emption deprives the leader of the option to postpone
investment, thereby lowering the required investment threshold.
Proposition 4.2.3 The pre-emptive leader’s optimal entry threshold is lower
than that of the monopolist.
Although increased risk aversion raises the required investment threshold by
decreasing the expected utility of the investment’s payoﬀ, the loss in the value of
the leader due to the entry of the follower, evaluated at P

ℓ
∗
p
, relative to that of
the monopolist is not aﬀected by risk aversion. Intuitively, the value of the leader
at P

ℓ
∗
p
equals the value of the follower’s investment opportunity. Since both
the follower and the monopolist hold a single option each to enter the market,
increased risk aversion poses a proportional decrease in the option value of the
follower relative to the monopolist.
Proposition 4.2.4 The loss in the pre-emptive leader’s value relative to the mo-
nopolist’s value of investment opportunity at the pre-emptive leader’s optimal en-
try threshold price is not aﬀected by risk aversion.
We next investigate how this ratio changes with uncertainty. In Figure 4.4,
the horizontal lines represent the utility of the instantaneous revenues the leader
receives over time under low uncertainty, , and under high uncertainty, 
′
. As we
will illustrate numerically, increased uncertainty raises the required entry thresh-
old of the follower by more than that of the leader. This results in the increase
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of the expected utility of the leader’s proﬁts, represented by the shaded area of
Figure 4.4, since, under higher uncertainty, she enjoys monopoly proﬁts for longer
time and the loss in the leader’s expected utility due to the entry of the follower
is not signiﬁcant enough to oﬀset it. In fact, this result is enhanced when the
discrepancy in market share is large, since the greater D(1) is, the greater the
pre-emptive leader’s incentive to invest will be as then the ﬁrst-mover advantages
are greater. Notice also that as greater uncertainty raises the required entry
threshold of the follower, the leader’s instantaneous revenues cannot drop below
the level corresponding to 
′
for t ≥ 
f
′
p
.
Proposition 4.2.5 The relative discrepancy between the value of the pre-emptive
leader and the monopolist at the pre-emptive leader’s optimal entry threshold price
diminishes with increasing uncertainty.
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Figure 4.4: Incremental change in pre-emptive leader’s instantaneous revenues
due to increased uncertainty
4.2.3 Symmetric Non-Pre-Emptive Duopoly
In the non-pre-emptive setting, the roles of the leader and the follower are deﬁned
exogenously, and, as a result, both ﬁrms have the option to delay their entry into
the market as the risk of pre-emption is eliminated. The follower’s value function
and entry threshold are unchanged from the pre-emptive case since she will still
enter the market considering that the leader is already there. Hence, the follower’s
value of investment opportunity at 
ℓ
n
is:
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Since the non-pre-emptive leader has discretion over investment timing, her
value of investment opportunity is described by:
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The solution to the optimisation problem (4.22) yields the optimal entry threshold
of the non-pre-emptive leader:
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Notice that by delaying entry, the leader suﬀers from forgoing cash ﬂows but
beneﬁts from temporarily delaying the entry of the follower. At the same time,
allowing the project to start at a higher output price yields a higher NPV but
then the leader enjoys monopoly revenues for less time. As it is shown in the
appendix, the marginal beneﬁt and marginal cost corresponding to the entry of
the follower cancel.
Proposition 4.2.6 The optimal entry threshold of the non-pre-emptive leader is
the same as that of the monopolist.
Notice that the leader’s option to invest consists of the expected utility of the
immediate payoﬀ reduced by an amount corresponding to the expected loss in
utility due to the entry of the follower. After the leader has entered the market
and prior to the entry of the follower, i.e., for P

ℓ
n
≤ P
t
< P

f
∗
n
, the leader receives
monopolistic proﬁts with expected utility described by (4.24):
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According to (4.24), although the leader is alone in the industry, the expected
utility of her proﬁts do not correspond to those of a monopolist since the potential
entry of a rival reduces the expected utility of the leader’s proﬁts. Finally, after
the follower’s entry, i.e., for t ≥ 
f
n
, the two ﬁrms share the industry, thereby
making equal proﬁts, and their value is simply the discounted expected utility of
the project’s cash ﬂows.
In the non-pre-emptive framework, the value of the leader would be the same
as the monopolist’s if it were not for the potential entry of the follower that
reduces the expected utility of the leader’s proﬁts. However, the reduction in
the leader’s value of investment opportunity due to the potential entry of the
follower decreases with risk aversion. This happens because risk aversion delays
the entry of the follower, thereby reducing the expected loss in the option value
of the leader. Consequently, the relative discrepancy between the leader’s value
of investment opportunity and the monopolist’s diminishes with increasing risk
aversion, thereby reducing the relative loss in the value of the non-pre-emptive
leader.
Proposition 4.2.7 The loss in the value of the investment opportunity for the
non-pre-emptive leader relative to that of a monopolist at the pre-emptive leader’s
optimal entry threshold price decreases with risk aversion.
According to Proposition 4.2.8, depending on the discrepancy in market share,
uncertainty may increase or decrease the relative loss in the value of the invest-
ment opportunity for the non-pre-emptive leader relative to that of a monopolist.
Notice that the value of the non-pre-emptive leader consists of the value of the
monopolistic investment opportunity and the expected loss in project value due
to the entry of the follower. Both of these components increase with uncertainty;
however, for the latter, the impact of uncertainty becomes less profound as the
discrepancy in market share diminishes. As a result, under low discrepancy in
market share, the impact of uncertainty on the non-pre-emptive leader’s value
of monopolistic investment opportunity dominates, thereby making her better
oﬀ. By contrast, under large discrepancy in market share, increased uncertainty
causes the loss in project value to increase faster than the value of the investment
opportunity, thereby making the non-pre-emptive leader worse oﬀ.
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Proposition 4.2.8 The discrepancy between the non-pre-emptive leader’s value
of investment opportunity and the monopolist’s at the pre-emptive leader’s optimal
entry threshold price increases with uncertainty if:

D(1)
D(2)


1
> e, e ≃ 2.718 (4.25)
In Figure 4.5, the instantaneous revenues of the leader are represented by the
solid line for low uncertainty, , and by the broken line for high uncertainty, 
′
.
Here, unlike the pre-emptive setting, the leader has the option to delay entry into
the market. Notice that a large discrepancy in market share implies a greater ﬁrst-
mover advantage but also leads to a greater loss in the value of the leader upon
the entry of the follower, which becomes more profound with higher uncertainty.
However, increased uncertainty also raises the value of the leader’s investment
opportunity, thereby creating an opposing eﬀect. According to Proposition 4.2.8,
under small discrepancy in market share, the increase in option value due to
increased uncertainty, represented by the shaded area between 
ℓ
n
and 
ℓ
′
n
in Figure
4.5, oﬀsets the loss in the leader’s revenues due to the entry of the follower, thereby
reducing the discrepancy between the value of the monopolist and the leader.
The opposite result is observed if the discrepancy in market share is large, since
then the loss in the leader’s revenues is more profound than the increase in the
value of her investment opportunity. This happens because a higher ﬁrst-mover
advantage reduces the required entry threshold of the leader. Consequently, the
increase in the value of the investment opportunity is less profound, and as higher
uncertainty impacts the loss in project value by more, the non-pre-emptive leader
becomes worse oﬀ.
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Figure 4.5: Incremental change in non-pre-emptive leader’s instantaneous rev-
enues due to increased uncertainty under low discrepancy in market share (left)
and large discrepancy (right)
4.3 Numerical Results
4.3.1 Pre-Emptive Duopoly
In order to examine the impact of risk aversion and uncertainty on the entry of the
pre-emptive leader and follower, we assume the following parameter values:  ∈
[0, 1),  ∈ [0.1, 0.5],  = 0.01, r =  = 0.04, K = $100, c = $0, D(0) = 0, D(1) =
1.5 or 3, and D(2) = 1. Figure 4.6 illustrates the impact of uncertainty on the
value of the pre-emptive leader and follower under risk aversion. First, we observe
that the leader’s entry threshold is lower than the monopolist’s. This happens due
to pre-emption since the leader does not have the option to defer investment and,
as a result, the risk of pre-emption reduces the required investment threshold.
On the other hand, the required investment threshold of the pre-emptive follower
is higher than that of the monopolist since the former requires compensation for
losing the ﬁrst-mover advantage. According to the graph on the right, uncertainty
increases the value of waiting, thereby raising the required investment threshold
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and delaying the entry of the follower. This, in turn, increases the time interval in
which the leader enjoys monopoly proﬁts and diminishes the relative discrepancy
between the value of the pre-emptive leader and that of the monopolist.
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Figure 4.6: Project and investment opportunity value of monopolist, pre-emptive
leader, and follower for  = 0.2 (left) and  = 0.4 (right) under risk aversion
( = 0.2) for D(1) = 3
Figure 4.7 illustrates the impact of risk aversion on the value of the pre-
emptive leader and follower. According to the graph on the right, increased risk
aversion reduces the expected utility of the investment’s payoﬀ for both the leader
and the monopolist, thereby raising their required investment thresholds. Fur-
thermore, it seems that the impact of risk aversion on the pre-emptive leader’s
value is greater than on the follower’s value. Consequently, the two curves inter-
sect at a higher output price, thereby indicating that the output price at which a
ﬁrm is indiﬀerent between becoming a leader or a follower increases with higher
risk aversion.
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Figure 4.7: Investment opportunity and project value of monopolist, pre-emptive
leader, and follower under risk neutrality (left) and risk aversion ( = 0.5) (right)
for  = 0.4 and D(1) = 3
4.3.2 Non-Pre-Emptive Duopoly
In the non-pre-emptive duopoly, the roles of the leader and the follower are pre-
assigned, and, as a result, both ﬁrms have the option to postpone their entry into
the market. According to Figure 4.8, the optimal entry threshold of the non-pre-
emptive follower is the same as in the pre-emptive case since the follower will still
enter the market considering that the leader has already invested. Notice also
that, the optimal entry threshold of the non-pre-emptive leader is the same as
the monopolist’s, and, as a result, the required investment threshold of the non-
pre-emptive leader is higher than that in the pre-emptive scenario. Although
the optimal entry threshold is the same for the monopolist and non-pre-emptive
leader, the investment opportunity value of the latter is lower than that of the
former since the potential entry of the follower reduces the expected utility of the
leader’s proﬁts. As the graph on the right illustrates, increased uncertainty raises
the value of waiting, which, in turn, postpones investment in all cases, thereby
increasing the required investment thresholds.
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Figure 4.8: Project and investment opportunity value for non-pre-emptive leader
and follower for  = 0.2 (left) and  = 0.4 (right) under risk aversion ( = 0.2)
for D(1) = 3
Figure 4.9 illustrates the impact of risk aversion on the optimal entry thresh-
olds of the monopolist and the non-pre-emptive leader and follower. As indicated
in the graphs, higher risk aversion reduces the expected utility of the investment’s
payoﬀ in all cases, thereby raising the required investment thresholds.
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Figure 4.9: Project and investment opportunity value for non-pre-emptive leader
and follower under risk neutrality (left) and risk aversion ( = 0.5) (right) for
 = 0.4 and D(1) = 3
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4.3.3 Sensitivity Analysis
As the left panel in Figure 4.10 illustrates, all entry thresholds increase with
volatility as greater uncertainty implies greater value of waiting and are higher
with risk aversion as it delays investment both for the leader and the follower by
decreasing the expected utility of the project’s cash ﬂows. Proposition 4.2.6 is
illustrated by the fact that the leader’s optimal investment threshold is the same
as the monopolist’s. Also, higher ﬁrst-mover advantages represented by greater
D(1) result in the decrease of the required entry thresholds of the pre-emptive
and non-pre-emptive leader as illustrated in the graph on the right.
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Figure 4.10: Optimal entry thresholds for D(1) = 1.5 (left) and D(1) = 3 (right)
In order to compare the pre-emptive and non-pre-emptive leader’s values to
the monopolist’s, we evaluate both at the pre-emptive leader’s optimal entry
threshold, i.e., at P

ℓ
∗
p
. According to the graph on the left in Figure 4.11, increased
uncertainty diminishes the relative loss in the pre-emptive leader’s value function,
i.e.,
F

j
m
(P

ℓ
∗
p
)− V
ℓ
p
(P

ℓ
∗
p
)
F

j
m
(P

ℓ
∗
p
)
(4.26)
thereby reducing the discrepancy between the pre-emptive leader’s value and the
monopolist’s value of investment opportunity. This happens because uncertainty
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postpones the entry of the follower, thus allowing the pre-emptive leader to enjoy
monopoly proﬁts longer. Notice that the impact of uncertainty is more profound
when the discrepancy in market share is low since then the expected loss due to
the follower’s entry is smaller.
Uncertainty increases the discrepancy in the non-pre-emptive leader’s value
of investment opportunity, i.e.,
F

j
m
(P

ℓ
∗
p
)− F

ℓ
n
(P

ℓ
∗
p
)
F

j
m
(P

ℓ
∗
p
)
(4.27)
if the discrepancy in market share is small, i.e.,

D(1)
D(2)


1
< e, as in the graph on
the left. Intuitively, this happens because under low discrepancy in market share,
the increase in the non-pre-emtpive leader’s value of investment opportunity due
to increased uncertainty is greater than the expected loss due to the entry of the
follower. However, if the discrepancy is large, then the increase in option value is
less profound with higher uncertainty due to higher ﬁrst-mover advantages and,
as a result, cannot oﬀset the expected loss from the follower’s entry, which is now
greater.
Furthermore, risk aversion does not aﬀect the relative loss in the value of
the leader for the pre-emptive duopoly setting, but it makes the loss in value
relatively less for the leader in a non-pre-emptive duopoly setting due to delayed
entry of the follower. Notice that at P

ℓ
∗
p
, the value function of the pre-emptive
leader is the same as the option value of the pre-emptive follower. As a result,
the impact of risk aversion on the value of the pre-emptive leader at P

ℓ
∗
p
is the
same as that on the value of the follower’s investment opportunity at the same
output price. Since the follower’s investment opportunity value diﬀers from the
monopolist’s only with respect to the market share, risk aversion impacts the
values of the follower and the monopolist proportionally.
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Figure 4.11: Relative loss in value of the pre-emptive and non-pre-emptive leader
for D(1) = 1.5 (left) and D(1) = 3 (right)
4.4 Conclusions
In Chapter 4, we develop a utility-based framework in order to examine the impact
of risk aversion and uncertainty on the optimal investment timing decisions of a
ﬁrm that faces competition. The analysis is motivated both by the increasing
competition resulting from the deregulation of many sectors of the economy such
as energy, telecommunications, transport, etc, and the fact that attitudes towards
the risk arising from the potential entry of a rival may impact investment decisions
of a ﬁrm. The combination of these two factors creates the need to incorporate
risk aversion into the real options framework, in order to analyse strategic aspects
of decision making under uncertainty.
We ﬁnd that, under the fear of pre-emption, higher uncertainty reduces the
relative loss in the value of the leader due to competition by delaying the entry of
the follower. However, in the non-pre-emptive setting, the impact of uncertainty is
ambiguous and depends on the discrepancy in market share. If the discrepancy is
large, the non-pre-emptive leader’s relative loss in value increases with uncertainty
since then the impact of the follower’s entry is more profound and oﬀsets the
increase in the leader’s value of investment opportunity. By contrast, under low
discrepancy in market share, higher uncertainty makes the non-pre-emptive leader
117
4.4 Conclusions
better oﬀ as the increase in the value of investment opportunity is greater than
the expected loss in value due to competition. Interestingly, the relative loss in
the pre-emptive leader’s value is not aﬀected by risk aversion, while the non-pre-
emptive leader becomes better oﬀ with greater risk aversion as it delays the entry
of the follower.
Since Chapter 4 considers the case where the two competing ﬁrms exhibit the
same level of risk aversion, a potential extension is to relax this assumption and
consider an asymmetric duopoly in terms of diﬀerent levels of risk aversion for
each ﬁrm. Furthermore, potentially useful insights could be extracted by allowing
for operational ﬂexibility like in Chapters 2 and 3. Directions for future research
may also include the application of a diﬀerent stochastic process, e.g., arithmetic
Brownian motion, or the study of other aspects of the real options literature, such
as the time to build or capacity sizing, under the same framework.
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Summary and Conclusions
Real options analysis adapts valuation techniques developed for ﬁnancial options
to non-ﬁnancial settings. Thus, it addresses the ﬂexibility and uncertainty present
in most capital budgeting decisions by analysing capital projects as a series of
options. The bulk of real options models are based on the assumptions of mar-
ket completeness and risk neutrality, which were inherited by corporate ﬁnance,
thereby ignoring the impact of risk aversion on investment decisions. However,
decision makers often exhibit risk aversion either due to costs of ﬁnancial dis-
tress or due to risk that cannot be diversiﬁed, which occurs for example in R&D
projects with technical risk that is idiosyncratic. The deregulation of many sec-
tors of the economy has resulted in greater competition and uncertainty, thus
shifting the focus to knowledge-based sectors such as R&D that become increas-
ingly important. Consequently, in an era of increasing economic uncertainty and
deregulation the need to develop a utility-based framework in order to account
for risk aversion becomes essential.
The objective of this thesis is to bridge the gaps in real options theory so that
it may be more suitable not only for decision making but also for risk assessment.
We begin by developing a utility-based framework in order to analyse how the
optimal investment decisions are aﬀected by risk aversion and uncertainty. In
order to quantify the impact of risk and operational ﬂexibility, we assume that
the project oﬀers suspension and resumption options that can be exercised at
any time. We proceed by assessing how the ﬂexibility to adjust capacity in
the presence of risk aversion impacts the value of an option to invest, thereby
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extending the traditional real options approach to investment under uncertainty
with discretion over capacity by allowing for risk aversion, through a CRRA utility
function, and operational ﬂexibility in the form of suspension and resumption
options. Finally, in order to explore strategic aspects of decision making under
uncertainty, we determine how duopolistic competition aﬀects the entry of risk-
averse investors and how the value of a ﬁrm under two diﬀerent oligopolistic
frameworks varies with risk aversion and uncertainty. Here, we will summarise
the results of this thesis, discuss its limitations and oﬀer directions for further
research.
5.1 Optimal Investment under Operational Flex-
ibility, Risk Aversion, and Uncertainty
In Chapter 2, we extend the real options approach with operational ﬂexibility,
i.e., a situation in which the decision maker has inﬁnitely many embedded op-
tions to suspend or resume the project, to account for risk aversion. We introduce
risk aversion on part of the decision maker via a CRRA utility-of-wealth function
analogous to Hugonnier and Morellec (2007). We solve this problem backwards
by ﬁrst assuming that the project is active and has a single abandonment option
at its disposal. This enables us to ﬁnd its expected value and exercise threshold
by solving the analogous optimal stopping problem. By then including this aban-
donment option in the payoﬀ of the original investment opportunity, we solve the
problem of investment in a project with a single abandonment option, i.e., we ob-
tain the investment and abandonment thresholds along with the expected value
of the investment opportunity. Finally, by extending this methodology to incor-
porate inﬁnitely many suspension and resumption options, we analyse a project
with complete operational ﬂexibility.
Our results indicate that operational ﬂexibility facilitates investment and op-
erational decisions by increasing the likelihood of investment, suspension, and
resumption of the investment project. Furthermore, we show that risk aversion
may increase the incentive for decision makers to delay the investment and re-
sumption of the investment project and accelerates their decision to abandon it.
Moreover, we describe how an environment of increasing uncertainty may aﬀect
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the optimal investment policy and lead to hysteresis. Also, we provide insights
regarding the behaviour of the optimal suspension threshold when the level of
risk aversion changes. Interestingly, numerical results indicate that increased risk
aversion may facilitate the abandonment of a project while delaying its tempo-
rary suspension prior to permanent resumption. Finally, we demonstrate how
operational ﬂexibility becomes more valuable as risk aversion increases and the
economic environment becomes more volatile.
In order to quantify further the degree to which the investor’s risk is hedged
through operational ﬂexibility, risk measures such as value-at-risk and conditional
value-at-risk for the canonical real options investment problem could be devel-
oped. Such risk measures quantify the market risk of a project which to date has
been applied only numerically to real options. Furthermore, in contrast to the
standard real options approach, it could be particularly insightful to determine
not only the expected value of the option to invest but also its moment-generating
function.
5.2 The Value of Capacity Sizing under Risk
Aversion and Operational Flexibility
In many capital projects, the investor also holds discretion over capacity, e.g.,
the size of a factory. Dangl (1999) uses a continuous cost function ﬁrst to ﬁnd
the optimal size of the active investment as a function of the price by maximising
the expected NPV. He then obtains the expected value of the option to invest
and the investment threshold price by using value-matching and smooth-pasting
conditions with the expected NPV function. In the third chapter, we extend this
approach by accounting for risk aversion on part of the investor via a CRRA
utility-of-wealth-function. Speciﬁcally, by ﬁrst assuming that the project value
evolves according to a GBM, we work backwards by solving for the capacity size
of the project that maximises the discounted expected utility of the project’s
cash ﬂows. Next, we substitute the utility-maximising capacity size, which is
a function of the project’s cash ﬂows, into the expression for the project value
and then solve the analogous optimal stopping problem. The resulting expected
option value, investment threshold price, and capacity size are then compared
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with the ones under the risk-neutral assumption of Dangl (1999) to gauge the
extent to which risk aversion aﬀects sizing decisions.
The objective in Chapter 3 is to assess how valuable discretion over the ca-
pacity of the project is under risk aversion and operational ﬂexibility. In contrast
to a project without scalable capacity, we ﬁnd that, with the option to delay
investment, increased risk aversion facilitates investment and decreases the re-
quired investment threshold price by reducing the amount of installed capacity.
We also ﬁnd that, when investing immediately, the relative loss in project value
due to installation of suboptimal capacity diminishes with risk aversion and un-
certainty. With operational ﬂexibility, discretion over capacity becomes more
valuable when exercising a now-or-never investment opportunity and less valu-
able when the option to defer investment is available when the capacity installed
is suboptimal.
One of the limitations of this model arises from the particular choice of a cost
function that is increasing and strictly convex, thereby implying that the average
cost is increasing. Due to this property, this model is best suited for analysing
projects that exhibit diseconomies of scale, e.g., renewable energy power plants.
This choice results from the assumption of an exogenous output price, which is
an additional limitation of the model since investment decisions do not aﬀect
future prices. This limitation is particularly obvious when investment in very
large capacity is optimal. Therefore, it would be interesting to examine the
implications of relaxing this assumption by allowing for the price to depend on
the capacity installed. Although useful insights regarding the robustness of the
model could be obtained through the application of diﬀerent utility functions or
alternative stochastic processes, nevertheless, it would be interesting to generalise
the results presented in the second and third chapters of the thesis so that they
are independent of the type of the utility function. This requires the veriﬁcation
of the results simply assuming that the output price follows a GBM and that the
decision maker’s preferences are described by an increasing and concave utility
function. Furthermore, other aspects of the real options literature, e.g., the time-
to-build problem, may be examined under the same framework.
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5.3 Duopolistic Competition under Risk Aver-
sion and Uncertainty
A monopolist typically defers entry into an industry as both price uncertainty and
the level of relative risk aversion increase. The former attribute may be present
in most deregulated industries, while the latter may be relevant for reasons of
market incompleteness or the presence of technical uncertainty. By contrast, it
has been shown that the presence of a rival hastens entry under risk neutrality
in certain frameworks. In the ﬁrst two chapters of this thesis, we have taken the
perspective of a price-taking ﬁrm that holds a perpetual option to investment in a
project with inﬁnite lifetime and wants to maximise the expected utility of future
proﬁts. In Chapter 4, we assume a duopolostic setting and analyse the strategic
interactions of decision making under uncertainty and risk aversion. Speciﬁcally,
we examine how duopolistic competition aﬀects the entry decisions of risk-averse
ﬁrms and explore how the impact of competition on the value of a ﬁrm under two
diﬀerent oligopolistic frameworks, i.e., pre-emptive and non-pre-emptive duopoly,
varies with risk aversion and uncertainty.
We show that the entry threshold of the non-pre-emptive leader is the same as
that of the monopolist under both risk neutrality and risk aversion. Moreover, we
illustrate how all entry thresholds increase with volatility as greater uncertainty
implies greater value of waiting and are higher than the thresholds under risk
neutrality. Also, the value of the leader in a duopoly relative to the value of
a monopolist at the pre-emptive leader’s optimal entry threshold indicates that
the non-pre-emptive duopoly leader is hurt less than the pre-emptive duopoly
leader. In the non-pre-emptive duopoly setting, if the discrepancy between the
market share of the leader and the follower is large, then the non-pre-emptive
leader’s relative loss in value increases with uncertainty since the impact of the
follower’s entry is more profound and oﬀsets the increase in the leader’s value
of investment opportunity. By contrast, under low discrepancy in market share,
higher uncertainty makes the non-pre-emptive leader better oﬀ as the increase in
the value of investment opportunity is greater than the expected loss in value due
to competition. Furthermore, risk aversion does not aﬀect the loss in the value
123
5.3 Duopolistic Competition under Risk Aversion and Uncertainty
of the leader for the pre-emptive duopoly setting, but it makes the loss in value
relatively less for the leader in a non-pre-emptive duopoly setting.
Since the analysis presented in Chapter 4 is restricted to the case where both
ﬁrms exhibit the same level of risk aversion, this framework can be extended
to account for the case of asymmetric duopoly where the levels of risk aversion
are diﬀerent. Furthermore, by analysing the case where each ﬁrm has discretion
over the capacity of the project will also provide further insights and allow for
comparisons with the results of the third chapter.
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Appendix A
Proofs of the Propositions of
Chapter 2
Proposition 2.2.1: Under a CRRA utility-of-wealth function, the expected utility
of a perpetual GBM discounted to P
0
is given by (2.10):
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∞
0
e
−t
U(P
t
)dt = AU(P
0
) (A.1)
where A =
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following quadratic equation:
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Proof: We want to derive the analytical expression of the following expectation:
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where P
t
follows GBM:
dP
t
= P
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dt + P
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t
(A.4)
Solving for P
t
we have:
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Inserting (A.5) into (A.3), the expression of the expectation we want to determine
becomes
E
P
0
Z
∞
0
e
−t
U

P
0
exp

 −
1
2

2

t + Z
t

dt (A.6)
Following the steps of Karatzas and Shreve (1999) p.146, the expectation (A.6)
can be written as:
E
P
0
Z
∞
0
e
−t
U (P
t
) dt =
2

2
(
1
− 
2
)

P

2
0
Z
P
0
0
x
−
2
−1
U (x) dx + P

1
0
Z
∞
P
0
x
−
1
−1
U (x) dx

(A.7)
Applying a CRRA utility function we have:
E
P
0
Z
∞
0
e
−t
U (P
t
) dt
=
2

2
(
1
− 
2
)

P

2
0
Z
P
0
0
x
−
2
−
1− 
dx + P

1
0
Z
∞
P
0
x
−
1
−
1− 
dx

= −
2

2
1
(1− 
1
− )(1− 
2
− )
U(P
0
)
= AU(P
0
) (A.8)
where A =

1

2
(1−
1
−)(1−
2
−)
.
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Proposition 2.2.2: Under a CRRA utility-of-wealth function, the optimal in-
vestment threshold is:
P
(0)
∗

1
= (c + rK)


2
+  − 1

2

1
1−
(A.9)
Proof: The optimisation problem is described by (A.10):
F
(0)

1
(P
0
) = max
P
(0)

1
≥P
0
 
P
0
P
(0)

1
!

1

AU

P
(0)

1

−
U(c + rK)


(A.10)
The FONC for the unconstrained optimisation problem (A.10) may be expressed
as follows:

2
1− 
2
− 
P
(0)
∗

1
1−
+ (c + rK)
1−
= 0 (A.11)
Solving with respect to P
(0)
∗

1
, we obtain the following expression for the optimal
investment threshold:
P
(0)
∗

1
= (c + rK)


2
+  − 1

2

1
1−
(A.12)
This is equivalent to the expression of the optimal investment threshold in Hugonnier
and Morellec (2007). Indeed, according to Hugonnier & Morellec:
P
(0)
∗

1
= (c + rK)


1

1
+  − 1
Δ


1
1−
(A.13)
where,
Δ =  + ( − 1)

 −
1
2

2


(A.14)
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For the two expressions to match, the following equality must be hold.

1

1
+  − 1
Δ

=

2
+  − 1

2
⇔

1

1
+  − 1

1 +
 − 1


 −
1
2

2


=

2
+  − 1

2
⇔ 
1

2

1 +
 − 1


 −
1
2

2


= (
1
+  − 1)(
2
+  − 1)
⇔ 
1

2

1 +
 − 1


 −
1
2

2


= 
1

2
+ 
1
 − 
1
+ 
2
 + 
2
−  − 
2
−  + 1
⇔ 
1

2
 − 1


 −
1
2

2


= 
1
( − 1) + 
2
( − 1) + ( − 1)− ( − 1)
⇔

1

2


 −
1
2

2


= 
1
+ 
2
+  − 1 (A.15)
Since

1
=
1
2
−


2
+
s



2
−
1
2

2
+
2

2
(A.16)

2
=
1
2
−


2
−
s



2
−
1
2

2
+
2

2
(A.17)
it follows from (A.15) that:

1

2


 −
1
2

2


= 
1
+ 
2
+  − 1
⇔ −
2

2


 −
1
2

2


= 1−
2

2
+  − 1
⇔ −
2

2
+  = −
2

2
+  (A.18)
which is true.
Proposition 2.2.3: The objective function is strictly concave at P
(0)
∗

1
iﬀ  < 1.
Proof: The objective function evaluated at the critical value, P
(0)
∗

1
, is the fol-
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lowing:
F
(0)
1

P
(0)
∗

1

=
 
P
0
P
(0)
∗

1
!

1
"
A
P
(0)
∗

1
1−
1− 
−
(c + rK)
1−
(1− )
#
(A.19)
Diﬀerentiating the objective function with respect to P
(0)
∗

1
twice yields the fol-
lowing result:
∂
2
F
(0)
1

P
(0)
∗

1

∂P
(0)
∗

1
2
= (1 + 
1
)
1
 
P
0
P
(0)
∗

1
!

1
 
1
P
(0)
∗

1
!
2
"
A
P
(0)
∗

1
1−
1− 
−
(c + rK)
1−
(1− )
#
+ 
1
 
P
0
P
(0)
∗

1
!

1
 
−
1
P
(0)
∗

1
!
AP
(0)
∗

1
−
−
 
P
0
P
(0)
∗

1
!

1
A(
1
+ )P
(0)
∗

1
−−1
(A.20)
The SOSC requires that
∂
2
F
(0)
1

P
(0)
∗

1

∂P
(0)
∗

1
2
< 0. Simplifying the above expression yields:
∂
2
F
(0)

1

P
(0)
∗

1

∂P
(0)
∗

1
2
< 0 ⇔
2
1
+  + 1
1− 
> 0 (A.21)
Notice that the numerator is positive, which implies that for the inequality to
hold the denominator needs to be positive as well. Hence, the SOSC is satisﬁed
if and only if 0 ≤  < 1.
Corollary 2.2.1: The MB curve is steeper than the MC curve at P
(0)
∗

1
.
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Proof: We will show that



∂MB
∂P
(0)

1



>



∂MC
∂P
(0)

1



P
(0)

1
≡P
(0)
∗

1
.

1
 
P
0
P
(0)
∗

1
!

1
1
P
(0)
∗

1
"

1

2
(1− 
1
− )(1− 
2
− )
P
(0)
∗

1
−
+

1
P
(0)
∗

1
U(c + rK)

#
+
 
P
0
P
(0)
∗

1
!

1
"

1

2

(1− 
1
− )(1− 
2
− )
P
(0)
∗

1
−−1
+

1
P
(0)
∗

1
2
U(c + rK)

#
>

1
 
P
0
P
(0)
∗

1
!

1
1
P
(0)
∗

1

2
1

2
(1− 
1
− )(1− 
2
− )
P
(0)
∗

1
−
1− 
+
 
P
0
P
(0)
∗

1
!

1

2
1

2

(1− 
1
− )(1− 
2
− )
P
(0)
∗

1
−−1
1− 
(A.22)
Simplifying (A.22) and substituting for P
(0)
∗

1
leads to the following result:
2
1
+  + 1 > 0 (A.23)
This is true since, 
1
> 1 and 0 ≤  < 1
Proposition 2.2.4: The optimal investment threshold is increasing with risk
aversion.
Proof: Diﬀerentiating the optimal investment threshold, P
(0)
∗

1
, with respect to
 yields:
P
(0)
∗

1
= (c + rK)


2
+  − 1

2

1
1−
⇒
∂P
(0)
∗

1
∂
= P
(0)
∗

1
∂
∂
ln
"
(c + rK)


2
+  − 1

2

1
1−
#
(A.24)
Since P
(0)
∗

1
> 0, we only need to determine the sign of
∂
∂
ln

(c + rK)


2
+−1

2

1
1−

.
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Hence,
∂ lnP
(0)
∗

1
∂
> 0 ⇔ ln

1− 
2
− 
−
2

> 1−
−
2
1− 
2
− 
(A.25)
We now set x =
−
2
1−
2
−
> 0 ⇒
1
x
=
1−
2
−
−
2
. Consequently, we need to show that:
− ln x > 1− x ⇔ ln x < x − 1 (A.26)
The equality lnx = x− 1 holds for  = 1, which is not considered here. To show
that inequality (A.26) holds, we ﬁrst need to show that:
e
x
≥ 1 + x, ∀x ∈ ℝ (A.27)
For all x ∈ ℝ, we assume a  ∈ ℕ such that  > −x, i.e.  + x > 0. Then,
1+
x

> 0, and so we have

1 +
x



≥ 1+ 
x

= 1+ x from Bernoulli’s inequality.
Finally, we have:
e
x
= lim
→∞

1 +
x



≥ lim
→∞
(1 + x) = 1 + x ⇒ e
x
≥ 1 + x ∀x ∈ ℝ (A.28)
Thus, we have shown that e
x
≥ 1 + x, ∀x ∈ ℝ. Hence, assuming that x > 0 and
using ln x instead of x, we have:
e
lnx
= x ≥ 1 + ln x ⇒ ln x ≤ x − 1 (A.29)
Proposition 2.2.5: The optimal investment threshold is increasing with volatil-
ity.
Proof: Since 
2
=
1
2
−


2
−
q



2
−
1
2

2
+
2

2
, substituting into the expression of
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the optimal investment threshold we have:
P
0
∗

1
= (c + rK)
⎛
⎝
1 +
 − 1
1
2
−


2
−
q



2
−
1
2

2
+
2

2
⎞
⎠
1
1−
(A.30)
Diﬀerentiating with respect to 
2
yields:
∂P
(0)
∗

1
∂
2
= c

1
1− 

⎡
⎣
1 +
 − 1
1
2
−


2
−
q



2
−
1
2

2
+
2

2
⎤
⎦
1
1−
−1
×
⎡
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎣
−
( − 1)



4
−

1
2
q
[


2
−
1
2
]
2
+
2

2


2



2
−
1
2
 
−


4

−
2

4



1
2
−


2
−
q



2
−
1
2

2
+
2

2

2
⎤
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎦
(A.31)
Note that:
2



2
−
1
2


−


4

−
2

4
< 0 ⇔ −

2

2
−
2 − 
2
< 0 (A.32)
which is true. Hence, the last term in (A.31) is positive. Since the rest of the
factors in (A.31) are positive, we conclude that
∂P
(0)
∗

1
∂
2
> 0.
Proposition 2.2.6: The objective function is strictly concave at P
(0)
∗

2
iﬀ  < 1.
Proof: The objective function evaluated at P
(0)
∗

2
takes the following expression,
F
(0)

2

P
(1)

1

=
 
P
(1)

1
P
(0)
∗

2
!

2
"
c
1−
(1− )
−A
P
(0)
∗

2
1−
1− 
#
(A.33)
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Diﬀerentiating twice with respect to P
(0)
∗

2
yields the following,
∂
2
F
(0)

2

P
(1)

1

∂P
(0)
∗

2
2
= 
2
(
2
+ 1)
 
P
(1)

1
P
(0)
∗

2
!

2
 
1
P
(0)
∗

2
!
2
"
c
1−
(1− )
−A
P
(0)
∗

2
1−
1− 
#
+
2
 
P
(1)

1
P
(0)
∗

2
!

2
 
1
P
(0)
∗

2
!
AP
(0)
∗

2
−
+
 
P
(1)

1
P
(0)
∗

2
!

2
A(
2
+ )P
(0)
∗

2
−−1
(A.34)
Simplifying the above expression, we have the following result:
∂
2
F
(0)

2

P
(1)

1

∂P
(0)
∗

2
2
< 0 ⇔  < 1 (A.35)
Hence, the objective function is concave at P
(0)
∗

2
if and only if  < 1.
Proposition 2.2.7: The optimal abandonment threshold is increasing with risk
aversion.
Proof: Following the same steps as in Proposition 2.2.4 we have:
∂P
(0)
∗

2
∂
> 0 ⇔ ln


1
+  − 1

1

> 1−

1

1
+  − 1
(A.36)
We now set x =

1

1
+−1
. Thus, we need to show that ln x < x − 1 which we have
already shown in Proposition 2.2.4 that holds.
Proposition 2.2.8: The optimal abandonment threshold is decreasing in volatil-
ity.
Proof: The optimal abandonment threshold is given by the following equation:
P
(0)
∗

2
= c


1
+  − 1

1

1
1−
(A.37)
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Substituting for 
1
, (A.37) takes the following expression:
P
(0)
∗

2
= c
⎡
⎣
1 +
 − 1
1
2
−


2
+
q



2
−
1
2

2
+
2

2
⎤
⎦
1
1−R
(A.38)
Diﬀerentiating (A.38) with respect to 
2
we have:
∂P
(0)
∗

2
∂
2
= c

1
1− 

⎡
⎣
1 +
 − 1
1
2
−


2
+
q



2
−
1
2

2
+
2

2
⎤
⎦
1
1−
−1
×
⎡
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎣
−
( − 1)



4
+

1
2
q
[


2
−
1
2
]
2
+
2

2


2



2
−
1
2
 
−


4

−
2

4



1
2
−


2
+
q



2
−
1
2

2
+
2

2

2
⎤
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎦
(A.39)
Notice that in (A.39):
2



2
−
1
2


−


4

−
2

4
< 0 ⇔ −

2

2
−
2 − 
2
< 0 (A.40)
The latter is true, and, therefore, the last term of (A.39) is negative. Hence, since
the ﬁrst three factors are positive, we conclude that
∂P
(0)
∗

2
∂
2
< 0.
Proposition 2.2.9: The optimal investment threshold price when a single aban-
donment option is available is less than that with an irreversible investment op-
portunity, ceteris paribus.
Proof: The FONCs that provide the optimal investment thresholds for the case
of irreversible investment and investment with a single abandonment option are:

2
1− 
2
− 
P
(0)
∗

1
1−
+ (c + rK)
1−
= 0 (A.41)

2
1− 
2
− 
P
(1)
∗

1
1−
+ (c + rK)
1−
+

2
− 
1

1
(1− )F
(0)

2
(P
(1)
∗

1
) = 0 (A.42)
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Subtracting the two equations, we have:
P
(0)
∗

1
1−
− P
(1)
∗

1
1−
= (1− 
2
− )F
(0)

2

P
(1)
∗

1

(A.43)
Since 
2
< 0 and F
(0)

2
(P
(1)
∗

1
) > 0 the quantity on the right-hand side is positive.
Hence:
P
(0)
∗

1
1−
− P
(1)
∗

1
1−
> 0 ⇒ P
(0)
∗

1
> P
1
∗

1
(A.44)
Proposition 2.2.10: The optimal resumption threshold is increasing with risk
aversion.
Proof: Similar to Proposition 2.2.4.
Proposition 2.2.11: The optimal suspension threshold is higher than the optimal
abandonment one.
Proof: Comparing the two FONCs that provide the optimal abandonment and
optimal suspension thresholds, we have:
1
1− 
1
− 
P
(0)
∗

2
1−
+
c
1−

1
= 0 (A.45)
1
1− 
1
− 
P
(1)
∗

2
1−
+
c
1−

1
−
(
1
− 
2
)(1− )

1

2
F
(0)

3

P
(1)
∗

2

= 0 (A.46)
By subtracting the two equations, we have:
P
(1)
∗

2
1−
− P
(0)
∗

2
1−
=
(
1
− 
2
)(1− 
1
− )(1− )

1

2
F
(0)

3

P
(1)
∗

2

(A.47)
Since 
1
> 1, 
2
< 0 and F
0

3

P
(1)
∗

2

≥ 0 quantity on the right-hand side is
positive. Therefore,
P
(1)
∗

2
1−
− P
(0)
∗

2
1−
> 0 ⇒ P
(1)
∗

2
> P
(0)
∗

2
(A.48)
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Proposition 2.2.12: The optimal investment threshold price when a single sus-
pension and a single resumption option is available is lower than that with an
investment opportunity with a single abandonment option.
Proof: The FONCs that yield the optimal investment thresholds are:

2
1− 
2
− 
P
(1)
∗

1
1−
+ (c + rK)
1−
+

2
− 
1

1
(1− )F
(0)

2

P
(1)
∗

1

= 0 (A.49)

2
1− 
2
− 
P
(2)
∗

1
1−
+ (c + rK)
1−
+

2
− 
1

1
(1− )F
(1)

2

P
(2)
∗

1

= 0 (A.50)
Subtracting these two equations, we have:
P
(1)
∗

1
1−
− P
(2)
∗

1
1−
=
(1− 
2
− )(
1
− 
2
)

1

2
×
(1− )

F
(0)

2

P
(1)
∗

1

− F
(1)

2

P
(2)
∗

1

(A.51)
Since the option to suspend operations with the embedded option to resume them
permanently, F
(1)

2

P
(2)
∗

1

, is greater than the abandonment option, F
(0)

2

P
(1)
∗

1

,
the right-hand side of (A.49) is negative indicating that:
P
(1)
∗

1
1−
− P
(2)
∗

1
1−
> 0 ⇒ P
(1)
∗

1
> P
(2)
∗

1
(A.52)
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Appendix B
Proofs of the Propositions of
Chapter 3
Proposition 3.2.1: For all  > 1 the optimisation problem (3.13) has a solution,
while for  ↓ 1the solution diverges.
Proof: According to (3.14), the marginal beneﬁt of increasing capacity is:
g
MB =
AP
0
1−
m˜
(0)

> 0, ∀m˜
(0)
> 0
⇒
∂
g
MB
∂m˜
(0)
= −
AP
0
1−
m˜
(0)
+1
< 0, ∀m˜
(0)
> 0 (B.1)
The marginal cost of increasing capacity is:
g
MC =
c + rbm˜
(0)
−1

h
cm˜
(0)
+ rbm˜
(0)

i

> 0, ∀m˜
(0)
> 0
⇒
∂
g
MC
∂m˜
(0)
=
rb( − 1)m˜
(0)
−2


cm˜
(0)
+ rbm˜
(0)



−


c + rbm˜
(0)
−1

2


cm˜
(0)
+ rbm˜
(0)


+1
(B.2)
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Regarding the sign of
∂
g
MC
∂m˜
(0)
we have:
∂
g
MC
∂m˜
(0)
> 0 ⇔
rb( − 1)m˜
(0)
−2


cm˜
(0)
+ rbm˜
(0)



−


c + rbm˜
(0)
−1

2


cm˜
(0)
+ rbm˜
(0)


+1
> 0
⇔ rb( − 1)m˜
(0)
−2

cm˜
(0)
+ rbm˜
(0)


− 

c + rbm˜
(0)
−1

2
> 0
⇔ rb( − 1)c + r
2
b
2
( − 1)m˜
(0)
−1
−
c
2
m˜
(0)
−1
− r
2
b
2

2
m˜
(0)
−1
−2crb > 0
⇔ ( − 1)c+ rb( − 1)m˜
(0)
−1
−
c
2
rbm˜
(0)
−1
− rbm˜
(0)
−1
−2c > 0
⇔ ( − 1− 2)c + rb( − 1− )m˜
(0)
−1
−
c
2
rbm˜
(0)
−1
> 0
⇔ ( − 1− 2)crbm˜
(0)
−1
+ r
2
b
2
( − 1− )m˜
(0)
2(−1)
−c
2
> 0 (B.3)
Setting x = m˜
(0)
−1
, (B.3) can be rewritten as

1
x
2
+ 
2
x + 
3
> 0 (B.4)
where 
1
= r
2
b
2
( − 1 − ), 
2
= rb( − 1 − 2)c, 
3
= −c
2
. Since Δ =

2
2
−4
1

3
> 0 and 
1
> 0, we conclude that (B.4) is true for x > 
1
, where 
1
is the
positive root of (B.4). Hence,
g
MC is increasing with m˜
(0)
for m˜
(0)
> 
1
−1
1
. Since
g
MB is constant under risk neutrality and strictly decreasing under risk aversion
while
g
MC is strictly increasing for m˜
(0)
> 
1
−1
1
and, for m˜
(0)
→ 0,
g
MB >
g
MC
we conclude that
g
MB and
g
MC curves intersect at a single point that denotes the
optimal capacity of the project.
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As  ↓ 1, we have:
g
MC =
c + rb
 [cm˜
(0)
+ rbm˜
(0)
]

⇒
∂
g
MC
∂m˜
(0)
=
− (c + rb)
2
 (cm˜
(0)
+ rbm˜
(0)
)
+1
< 0, ∀m˜
(0)
> 0 (B.5)
Thus, the
g
MB and
g
MC are positive and decreasing in m˜
(0)
. Hence, for  ↓ 1 we
have:
g
MB >
g
MC ⇔
AP
0
1−
m˜
(0)

>
c + rb
 [cm˜
(0)
+ rbm˜
(0)
]

⇔ AP
0
1−
>
(c + rb)
1−

⇔ AU(P
0
) >
U(c + rb)

(B.6)
which is true. As the marginal cost of increasing capacity is always less than the
marginal beneﬁt, it is always optimal to install greater capacity.
Proposition 3.2.2: For a now-or-never investment opportunity, the optimal ca-
pacity decreases with uncertainty under risk aversion.
Proof: When the ﬁrm invests in the project immediately, i.e., at P
0
, the value
of the optimal capacity is determined by equating the
g
MB of increasing capacity
to the
g
MC. This is described by (3.14), which we re-write here:
AP
0
1−
m˜
(0)

=
c + rbm˜
(0)
−1

h
cm˜
(0)
+ rbm˜
(0)

i

(B.7)
Notice that while under risk neutrality the
g
MB is constant, i.e.:
g
MB =
P
0
r − 
(B.8)
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under risk aversion, we observe that the
g
MB is a strictly decreasing and convex
function of m˜
(0)
:
∂
g
MB
∂m˜
(0)
= −
AP
0
1−
m˜
(0)
+1
< 0, ∀m˜
(0)
> 0 (B.9)
∂
2
g
MB
∂m˜
(0)
2
=
( + 1)AP
0
−1
m˜
(0)
+2
> 0, ∀m˜
(0)
> 0 (B.10)
On the other hand,
∂
g
MC
∂m˜
(0)
=
rb( − 1)m˜
(0)
−2
− 

cm˜
(0)
+ rbm˜
(0)


−1

c + rbm˜
(0)
−1

2


cm˜
(0)
+ rbm˜
(0)



(B.11)
Notice that under risk neutrality, i.e., for  = 0,
∂
g
MC
∂m˜
(0)
=
rb( − 1)m˜
(0)
−2

> 0, ∀m˜
(0)
> 0 (B.12)
and
∂
2
g
MC
∂m˜
(0)
2
=
rb( − 1)( − 2)m˜
(0)
−3

> 0, ∀m˜
(0)
> 0 (B.13)
Hence, under risk neutrality, the cost function is strictly increasing and convex.
By introducing a utility-based framework and applying the CRRA utility func-
tion, we perform a concave transformation of the cost function. In fact, increasing
risk aversion diminishes the convexity of the cost function and increases its con-
cavity. Consequently, for small values of m˜
(0)
, the
g
MC decreases with increasing
risk aversion and then increases. Without loss of generality, we assume that the
initial output price is such that exercising a now-or-never investment opportunity
yields positive proﬁts. Since the
g
MB is strictly decreasing and the
g
MC eventu-
ally increases, the
g
MB and
g
MC curves intersect at a single point that denotes
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the optimal capacity of the project. Notice now that:
∂A
∂
2
< 0 ⇒
∂
g
MB
∂
2
< 0 (B.14)
Hence, volatility decreases the expected utility of the revenues for  > 0. Since
the cost of investment is non-stochastic, the
g
MC is independent of 
2
, as volatil-
ity increases the
g
MB and
g
MC curves will intersect at a lower level of capacity,
which indicates that the optimal capacity of the project decreases with volatility
when the ﬁrm exercises a now-or-never investment opportunity.
Proposition 3.2.3: For an irreversible investment opportunity, the optimal in-
vestment threshold is:
P
(0)

1

m
(0)
∗

=

c + rbm
(0)
∗−1



2
+  − 1

2

1
1−
(B.15)
Proof: In the case of investment without operational ﬂexibility, the value of the
option to invest is given by:
F
(0)

1
(P
0
) = max
P
(0)

1
≥P
0
 
P
0
P
(0)

1
!

1
⎡
⎣
AU

m
(0)
∗
P
(0)

1

−
U

cm
(0)
∗
+ rbm
(0)
∗


⎤
⎦
(B.16)
This optimisation problem considers the inner extremum over capacity choice,
which is described by (B.7) and may be expressed as:
Am
(0)
∗−
P
(0)

1
1−
−
1


cm
(0)
∗
+ rbm
(0)
∗

−

c + rbm
(0)
∗−1

= 0 (B.17)
Notice that since investment takes place at 
1
, we have substituted P
0
with P
(0)

1
.
Also, since the capacity of the project is a function of the output price at in-
vestment, we have m
(0)
′
≡
∂m
(0)

P
(0)

1

∂P
(0)

1
. The FONC for the optimisation problem
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described by (B.16) is:
∂F
(0)

1
(P
0
)
∂P
(0)

1
= 0 ⇔

Am
(0)
∗−
P
(0)

1
1−
1


cm
(0)
∗
+ rbm
(0)
∗

−

c + rbm
(0)
∗−1


| {z }
= 0
m
(0)
∗ ′
−

1
P
(0)

1
⎡
⎢
⎣
A

m
(0)
∗
P
(0)

1

1−
1− 
−

cm
(0)
∗
+ rbm
(0)
∗

1−
(1− )
⎤
⎥
⎦
+
AP
(0)

1
−
m
(0)
∗1−
= 0 (B.18)
Solving (B.18) with respect to P
(0)

1
we have:
∂F
(0)

1
(P
0
)
∂P
(0)

1
= 0 ⇔ P
(0)

1

m
(0)
∗

=

c + rbm
(0)
∗−1



2
+  − 1

2

1
1−
(B.19)
Corollary 3.2.1 The MB curve is steeper than the MC curve at P
(0)
∗

1
.
Proof: See Corollary 2.2.1 in Chapter 2.
Proposition 3.2.4 For an irreversible investment opportunity, the optimal ca-
pacity is:
m
(0)
∗
=

c
rb
1− 
(
1
+  − 1)− 
1

1
−1
,  >

1

1
+  − 1
(B.20)
Proof: Inserting the expression for P
(0)

1

m
(0)
∗

described by (B.19) into (B.17),
we have:
Am
(0)
∗−

c + rbm
(0)
∗−1

1−


2
+  − 1

2

−
1

c + rbm
(0)
∗−1

cm
(0)
∗
+ rbm
(0)
∗



= 0
⇔
1− 

1
+  − 1
c + rbm
(0)
∗−1


1
(1− )− ( − 1)

1
+  − 1

= 0 (B.21)
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Hence, the expression for the optimal capacity size is:
m
(0)
∗
=

c
rb
1− 
(
1
+  − 1)− 
1

1
−1
(B.22)
For the closed-form expression of m
(0)
∗
, and, in turn, P
(0)
∗

1
to hold we need
(
1
+  − 1) − 
1
> 0; otherwise, we will obtain negative values for the op-
timal investment threshold and optimal capacity. This condition implies that
 >

1

1
+−1
. Notice that 
1
+  − 1 < 
1
and, as a result,

1

1
+−1
> 1. Conse-
quently, for our results to hold, we need to choose  larger than

1

1
+−1
, which
implies that the cost function cm
(i)
+ rK

m
(i)

must be signiﬁcantly convex.
Proposition 3.2.5: The optimal capacity is decreasing in risk aversion.
Proof: Partially diﬀerentiating (B.22) with respect to , we have:
∂m
(0)
∗
∂
=
1
 − 1

c
rb
1− 
(
1
+  − 1)− 
1

2−
−1
×
c
rb
−
1
( − 1)
((
1
+  − 1)− 
1
)
2
(B.23)
Note that the last term on the right-hand side of (B.23) is negative, and, as a
result, we have
∂m
(0)
∗
∂
< 0.
Proposition 3.2.6: The optimal investment threshold price is decreasing in risk
aversion.
Proof: Solving (B.19) with respect to m
(0)
∗
we have:
m
(0)

P
(0)
∗

1

=
"
1
rb
"


2
+  − 1

2

−
1
1−
P
(0)
∗

1
− c
##
1
−1
(B.24)
By substituting the expression for P
(0)
∗

1
from (B.19) into (B.24) we have:
m
(0)

P
(0)
∗

1

=

c
rb
1− 
 (
1
+  − 1)− 
1

1
−1
(B.25)
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Hence,
"
1
rb
"


2
+  − 1

2

−
1
1−
P
(0)
∗

1
− c
##
1
−1
=

c
rb
1− 
(
1
+  − 1)− 
1

1
−1
(B.26)
Notice also that:
∂m
(0)

P
(0)
∗

1

∂P
(0)
∗

1
=
1
 − 1
"
1
rb
"


2
+  − 1

2

−
1
1−
P
(0)
∗

1
− c
##
1
−1
−1
×
1
rb


2
+  − 1

2

−
1
1−
(B.27)
As a result,
∂m
(0)

P
(0)
∗

1

∂P
(0)
∗

1
> 0 ⇔ P
(0)
∗

1
>


2
+  − 1

2

1
1−
c (B.28)
which according to (B.19) is true. From this, we infer that m
(0)

P
(0)
∗

1

is a
monotonically increasing function of P
(0)
∗

1
. Also, according to Proposition 3.2.5,
m
(0)
∗
is decreasing with risk aversion. From these results, we conclude that the
optimal investment threshold price is decreasing with risk aversion. This is true
because if the optimal investment threshold increased with higher risk aversion,
then, due to the monotonicity of m
(0)

P
(0)
∗

1

, the corresponding optimal capac-
ity would be greater, but this would contradict Proposition 3.2.5.
Proposition 3.2.7: The optimal capacity is increasing in volatility.
Proof: We now diﬀerentiate (B.20) with respect to :
∂m
(0)
∗
∂
=
1
 − 1

c
rb
1− 
(
1
+  − 1)− 
1

2−
−1
×
c
rb
−
∂
1
∂
(1− )( − 1)
((
1
+  − 1)− 
1
)
2
(B.29)
Since
∂
1
∂
< 0, the right-hand side of (B.29) is positive, and, hence, we have
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∂m
(0)
∗
∂
> 0.
Proposition 3.2.8: The optimal investment threshold price is increasing in
volatility.
Proof: Substituting the expression for m
(0)
∗
from (B.22) into (B.19) we obtain
the expression of the optimal investment threshold:
P
(0)
∗

1
=

c +
c(1− )
(
1
+  − 1)− 
1


2
+  − 1

2

1
1−
(B.30)
Let  =


2
+−1

2

1
1−
; From Chapter 2 we have that
∂
∂
2
> 0. Also, according
to Proposition 3.2.7, the optimal capacity of the project is increasing in volatil-
ity. Hence, the ﬁrst factor on the right-hand side of (B.30) is also increasing in
volatility.
Proposition 3.2.9: With a single abandonment option, the optimal capacity of
the project is greater compared to an irreversible now-or-never investment oppor-
tunity, ceteris paribus.
Proof: This result follows from the properties of the
g
MB and the
g
MC of increas-
ing capacity, described in Proposition 3.2.2, and the fact that at abandonment
the expected utility of the revenues is greater than the expected utility of the
forgone cash ﬂows. The expressions of the
g
MB and the
g
MC are:
g
MB =
AU (P
0
)
m˜
(1)

+
 
P
0
P
(0)
∗

2
!

2
U(c)
m˜
(1)

(B.31)
g
MC =

c + rbm˜
(1)
−1

−

c + rbm˜
(1)
−1

(1− )m˜
(1)

+
 
P
0
P
(0)
∗

2
!

2
AU

P
(0)
∗

2

m˜
(1)

(B.32)
Notice that the last terms on the right-hand sides of (B.31) and (B.32) represent
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the extra
g
MB and
g
MC from the embedded abandonment option, respectively. As
their analytic expressions indicate, the former is the discounted expected utility
of the salvageable operating cost divided by a monotonic function of the capacity,
while the latter is the discounted expected utility of the forgone cash ﬂows di-
vided by the same function of the capacity. Since, at abandonment, the optimal
abandonment threshold is strictly less than the operating cost, as (A.37) indi-
cates, the extra
g
MB from abandonment is greater than the corresponding extra
g
MC:
 
P
0
P
(0)
∗

2
!

2
U(c)
m˜
(1)

>
 
P
0
P
(0)
∗

2
!

2
AU

P
(0)
∗

2

m˜
(1)

, ∀m˜
(1)
> 0 (B.33)
Hence, the
g
MB from increasing capacity increases more than the
g
MC. As a
result, the
g
MB and
g
MC curves intersect at a higher level of capacity, thereby
indicating the increase of the optimal capacity due to the embedded abandonment
option.
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Appendix C
Proofs of the Propositions of
Chapter 4
Proposition 4.2.1: Uncertainty and risk aversion increase the optimal invest-
ment threshold.
Proof: See Propositions 2.2.4 and 2.2.5 in Chapter 2.
Proposition 4.2.2: The value function of the pre-emptive leader is concave
and its maximum value is obtained prior to the entry of the pre-emptive follower
provided that:
D(2) < D(1)


1
+  − 1

1

1
1−
(C.1)
Proof: The value of the pre-emtpive leader is:
V
ℓ
p
(P
t
) = AU (P
t
D(1)) −
U (rK)

+
 
P
t
P

f
∗
p
!

1
AU(P

f
∗
p
)

D(2)
1−
− D(1)
1−

(C.2)
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Diﬀerentiating (C.2) with respect to P
t
we have:
∂V
ℓ
p
(P
t
)
∂P
t
= AD(1)
1−
P
t
−
+ 
1
 
P
t
P

f
∗
p
!

1
1
P
t
AU(P

f
∗
p
)

D(2)
1−
− D(1)
1−

(C.3)
Hence,
∂V
ℓ
p
(P
t
)
∂P
t
= 0 ⇒ P
t
= P

f
∗
p
(

1
1− 
"
1−

D(2)
D(1)

1−
#)
1
1−
1
−
(C.4)
Notice that
1
1−
1
−
< 0. Hence, for (C.4) to be valid we must have:
1−

D(2)
D(1)

1−
> 0 ⇔

D(2)
D(1)

1−
< 1 ⇔ D(2) < D(1) (C.5)
which is true. In order to show that the value of the pre-emptive leader obtains
a maximum, we partially diﬀerentiate (C.3) with respect to P
t
.
∂
2
V
ℓ
p
(P
t
)
∂P
t
2
= AD(1)
1−
(−)P
t
−−1
+
1
(
1
− 1)P
t

1
−2
 
1
P

f
∗
p
!

1
AU(P

f
∗
p
)

D(2)
1−
− D(1)
1−

(C.6)
As both terms in (C.6) are negative, we have
∂
2
V
ℓ
p
(P
t
)
∂P
t
2
< 0 for all P
t
∈
h
P

ℓ
p
, P

f
∗
p

.
Finally, we will derive the condition under which the output price at which V
ℓ
p
(P
t
)
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becomes maximised is lower than the optimal entry threshold of the follower:
(

1
1− 
"
1−

D(2)
D(1)

1−
#)
1

1
+−1
> 1
⇔

1
1− 
"
1−

D(2)
D(1)

1−
#
> 1
⇔ 1−

D(2)
D(1)

1−
>
1− 

1
⇔ D(2) <


1
+  − 1

1

1
1−
D(1) (C.7)
Notice that

1
+−1

1
< 1. This implies that in order for the value function of the
pre-emptive leader to decrease prior to the entry of the follower, the discrepancy
in market share must be signiﬁcantly large.
Proposition 4.2.3: The pre-emptive leader’s entry threshold is lower than that
of the monopolist.
Proof: First, notice that the follower’s value of investment opportunity is:
F

f
p
(P
t
) =
 
P
t
P

f
∗
p
!

1
V
f
p

P

f
∗
p

(C.8)
Hence
∂F

f
p
(P
t
)
∂P
t
= 
1
P

1
−1
t
 
1
P

f
∗
p
!

1
V
f
p

P

f
∗
p

> 0, ∀P
t
∈
h
P

ℓ
p
, P

f
∗
p

(C.9)
and
∂
2
F

f
p
(P
t
)
∂P
2
t
= 
1
(
1
− 1)P

1
−2
t
 
1
P

f
∗
p
!

1
V
f
p

P

f
∗
p

> 0, ∀P
t
∈
h
P

ℓ
p
, P

f
∗
p

(C.10)
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Thus, the value of the follower’s investment opportunity is convex and strictly
increasing from zero. Second, from Proposition 4.2.2, we know that the pre-
emptive leader’s value function is strictly concave in P
t
starting from a negative
value. Consequently, for P
t
< P

f
∗
p
the two value functions intersect at most
once. In order to show that the pre-emptive leader’s entry threshold is lower
than that of the monopolist, we will evaluate the pre-emptive leader’s value and
the pre-emptive follower’s value of investment opportunity at the monopolist’s
entry threshold. The objective is to prove that at the monopolist’s optimal entry
threshold, the value of the pre-emptive leader is greater than the value of the
pre-emptive follower’s investment opportunity, i.e.,
AU

P

j
∗
m
D(1)

−
U (rK)

+
 
P

j
∗
m
P

f
∗
p
!

1
h
AU

P

f
∗
p
D(2)

−AU

P

f
∗
p
D(1)
i
>
 
P

j
∗
m
P

f
∗
p
!

1

AU

P

f
∗
p
D(2)

−
U(rK)


(C.11)
Substituting for P

j
∗
m
and P

f
∗
p
we have:
1−  + 
1

D(2)
D(1)


1
"
1−

D(1)
D(2)

1−
#
>

D(2)
D(1)


1
(1− )
⇔ (1− )

D(1)
D(2)


1
− 
1

D(1)
D(2)

1−
> 1− 
1
−  (C.12)
The last inequality can be written as follows:
b − a + ax
b
− bx
a
> 0 (C.13)
where a = 1− < 1, b = 
1
> 1, and x =

D(1)
D(2)

> 1. Since b−a = 
1
+−1 > 0,
in order to show (C.13), we need to show that ax
b
− bx
a
> 0. For this reason, let:
f(x) = ax
b
− bx
a
(C.14)
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Notice that:
f
′
(x) = ab

x
b−1
− x
a−1

(C.15)
Since b > a ⇒ f
′
(x) > 0. Notice also that:
f
′′
(x) = ab

(b − 1)x
b−2
− (a − 1)x
a−2

> 0 (C.16)
which implies that f(x) is increasing and convex. Also:
f
′
(x) = 0 ⇒ x = 1 and f(1) = 0 (C.17)
As a result, the minimum value of f(x) is at x = 1 and is equal to f(1) = 0.
Thus,
f(x) > f(1) = 0 ⇒ ax
b
− bx
a
> 0, ∀ x > 1 (C.18)
Therefore, at the entry threshold of the monopolist, the value function of the
pre-emptive leader is greater than the follower’s value of investment opportunity.
Notice also that:
P
t
→ 0 ⇒ V
ℓ
p
(P
t
) < F

f
p
(P
t
) (C.19)
Since, according to Proposition 4.2.2, the maximum that the value of the pre-
emptive leader can obtain in
h
P

ℓ
p
, P

f
∗
p

is global, this implies that, ∀P
t
: P
t
<
P

j
∗
m
, ∃ at most one price P

ℓ
∗
p
: F

f
p
= V
ℓ
p
. Hence, from (C.18) and (C.19), we
conclude that P

ℓ
∗
p
< P

j
∗
m
.
Proposition 4.2.4: The loss in the pre-emptive leader’s value relative to the
monopolist’s value of investment opportunity at the pre-emptive leader’s optimal
entry threshold price is unaﬀected by risk aversion.
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Proof: In order to show that the relative loss in value is unaﬀected by risk
aversion, we consider the following ratio:
V
ℓ
p

P

ℓ
∗
p

F

j
m

P

ℓ
∗
p

(C.20)
Notice that F

j
m
(⋅) is given by (4.11), which we re-write here for P
0
= P

ℓ
∗
p
:
F

j
m

P

ℓ
∗
p

=
 
P

ℓ
∗
p
P

j
∗
m
!

1

AU

P

j
∗
m
D(1)

−
U (rK)


(C.21)
Similarly, the expression for V
ℓ
p
(⋅) evaluated at P

ℓ
∗
p
is given by:
V
ℓ
p

P

ℓ
∗
p

= AU

P

ℓ
∗
p
D(1)

−
U (rK)

+
 
P

ℓ
∗
p
P

f
∗
p
!

1
AU

P

f
∗
p


D(2)
1−
− D(1)
1−

(C.22)
Notice also that for P

ℓ
∗
p
, the equality V
ℓ
p
(P

ℓ
∗
p
) = F

f
p
(P

ℓ
∗
p
) holds, i.e.:
AU

P

ℓ
∗
p
D(1)

−
U (rK)

+
 
P

ℓ
∗
p
P

f
∗
p
!

1
AU

P

f
∗
p


D(2)
1−
− D(1)
1−

=
 
P

ℓ
∗
p
P

f
∗
p
!

1

AU

P

f
∗
p
D(2)

−
U(rK)


(C.23)
Substituting the expressions for P

ℓ
∗
p
and P

j
∗
m
from (4.15) and (4.17) into (C.21)
and (C.23), respectively, we have:
F

j
m

P

ℓ
∗
p

=
 
P

ℓ
∗
p
P

j
∗
m
!

1

1− 

1
+  − 1

U (rK)

(C.24)
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and
V
ℓ
p

P

ℓ
∗
p

=
 
P

ℓ
∗
p
P

f
∗
p
!

1

1− 

1
+  − 1

U (rK)

(C.25)
By cancelling the P

ℓ
∗
p
term and substituting for P

j
∗
m
and P

f
∗
p
, we have:
V
ℓ
p

P

ℓ
∗
p

F

j
m

P

ℓ
∗
p

=

D(2)
D(1)


1
(C.26)
As a result, the relative loss in the value of the pre-emptive leader is constant
and, for this reason, is unaﬀected by risk aversion.
Proposition 4.2.5: The relative discrepancy between the value of the pre-emptive
leader and the monopolist at the pre-emptive leader’s optimal entry threshold price
diminishes with increasing uncertainty.
Proof: According to (C.26), the relative value of the pre-emptive leader com-
pared to that of a monopolist is:
V
ℓ
p

P

ℓ
∗
p

F

j
m

P

ℓ
∗
p

=
V
ℓ
p

P

ℓ
∗
p

F

j
m

P

ℓ
∗
p

=

D(2)
D(1)


1
(C.27)
Partially diﬀerentiating (C.27) with respect to , we have:
∂
∂
(

D(2)
D(1)


1
)
=

D(2)
D(1)


1
ln

D(2)
D(1)

∂
1
∂
(C.28)
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Notice that since
∂
1
∂
< 0 and ln

D(2)
D(1)

< 0, we have:
∂
∂
⎡
⎣
V
ℓ
p

P

ℓ
∗
p

F

j
m

P

ℓ
∗
p

⎤
⎦
> 0 (C.29)
This implies that with increasing uncertainty, the loss in the value of the pre-
emptive leader relative to the monopolist’s diminishes.
Proposition 4.2.6: The optimal entry threshold of the non-pre-emptive leader
is the same as that of the monopolist.
Proof: Given the initial output price, P
0
, and assuming that the follower has
chosen the optimal policy, the non-pre-emptive leader’s entry problem is described
by (C.30):
F

ℓ
n
(P
0
) = max
P

ℓ
n
≥P
0
(

P
0
P

ℓ
n


1

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
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
ℓ
n
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
−
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
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
ℓ
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
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∗
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
f
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
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
i
⎤
⎦
⎫
⎬
⎭
(C.30)
Partially diﬀerentiating (C.30) with respect to P

ℓ
n
yields:
∂F

ℓ
n
∂P

ℓ
n
= 
1

P
0
P

ℓ
n


1

−
1
P

ℓ
n

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
P

ℓ
n
D(1)

−
U(rK)


+
+

P
0
P

ℓ
n


1
AD(1)
1−
P
−

ℓ
n
+ 
1

P
0
P

ℓ
n


1

−
1
P

ℓ
n

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ℓ
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
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∗
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1
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
P

f
∗
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

D(2)
1−
− D(1)
1−

i
+ 
1

P
0
P

ℓ
n


1
 
P

ℓ
n
P

f
∗
n
!

1

1
P

ℓ
n

h
AU

P

f
∗
n


D(2)
1−
− D(1)
1−

i
(C.31)
Rearranging (C.31) in order to equate the marginal beneﬁt of delaying invest-
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ment to the marginal cost yields (C.32). The ﬁrst term on the left-hand side
of (C.32) corresponds to the reduction in marginal cost due to saved investment
cost, while the second term is the marginal beneﬁt from starting the project at a
higher output price. The third term reﬂects the marginal beneﬁt from delaying
investment, which postpones the entry of the follower. The ﬁrst term on the
right-hand side of (C.32) corresponds to the marginal cost of forgone cash ﬂows
due to postponed investment, while the second term reﬂect the marginal cost
from enjoying monopoly proﬁts for less time.

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
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
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
ℓ
n


1
AD(1)
1−
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
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∗
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
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= 
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
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
ℓ
n

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
ℓ
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
f
∗
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
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
ℓ
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
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− D(1)
1−

i
(C.32)
Notice that the marginal beneﬁt from postponing investment cancels with the
marginal cost from enjoying monopoly proﬁts for less time, and, thus, we obtain
(C.33):
∂F

ℓ
n
∂P

ℓ
n
= 0 ⇔ 
1

P
0
P

ℓ
n


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
−
1
P

ℓ
n

AU

P

ℓ
n
D(1)

−
U(rK)


+
+

P
0
P

ℓ
n


1
AD(1)
1−
P
−

ℓ
n
= 0
⇔ P

ℓ
∗
n
=
rK
D(1)


2
+  − 1

2

1
1−
(C.33)
From (C.33), we see that the optimal investment threshold for the non-pre-
emptive leader is the same as the monopolist’s.
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Proposition 4.2.7: The loss in the value of the investment opportunity for the
non-pre-emptive leader relative to that of a monopolist at the pre-emptive leader’s
optimal entry threshold price decreases with risk aversion.
Proof: The relative loss in the non-pre-emptive leader’s value is:
F

j
m

P

ℓ
∗
p

− F

ℓ
n

P

ℓ
∗
p

F

j
m

P

ℓ
∗
p

= 1−
F

ℓ
n

P

ℓ
∗
p

F

j
m

P

ℓ
∗
p

(C.34)
Recall that prior to investment, the non-pre-emptive leader’s value of investment
opportunity at P

ℓ
∗
p
is:
F

ℓ
n

P

ℓ
∗
p

=

P

ℓ
∗
p
P

ℓ
∗
n


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
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
P

ℓ
∗
n
D(1)

−
U(rK)

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
ℓ
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P

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∗
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1− 

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1−
− D(1)
1−

⎤
⎦
⎤
⎦
(C.35)
Notice that the expression of the monopolist’s value of investment opportunity,
F

j
m
(⋅), evaluated at P

ℓ
∗
p
is given by (C.36):
F

j
m

P

ℓ
∗
p

=
 
P

ℓ
∗
p
P

j
∗
m
!

1

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
P

j
∗
m
D(1)

−
U (rK)


(C.36)
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Hence,
1−
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
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
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
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(C.37)
Partially diﬀerentiating (C.34) with respect to  yields:
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(C.38)
According to (C.38),
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Setting x =

D(1)
D(2)

1−
> 0 we have:
x − 1− x ln x ≤ 0 ⇔ x (1− ln x) ≤ 1
⇔ 1− ln x ≤
1
x
⇔ 1 + ln
1
x
≤
1
x
⇔ − ln
1
x
≥ 1−
1
x
(C.40)
Setting
1
x
= y we have:
− ln y ≥ 1− y ⇔ ln y ≤ y − 1 (C.41)
which is true.
Proposition 4.2.8: The discrepancy between the non-pre-emptive leader’s value
of investment opportunity and the monopolist’s at the pre-emptive leader’s optimal
entry threshold price increases with uncertainty if:

D(1)
D(2)


1
> e
Proof: According to (C.37), the relative loss in option value of the non-pre-
emptive leader is:
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Partially diﬀerentiating with respect to  we have:
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Hence,
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